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ABSTRACT
This Article is an empirical study of what we call
citation stickiness. A citation is sticky if it appears in
one of the parties’ briefs and then again in the court’s
opinion. Imagine that the parties use their briefs to toss
citations in the court’s direction. Some of those
citations stick and appear in the opinion—these are the
sticky citations. Some of those citations don’t stick
and go unmentioned by the court—these are the
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unsticky ones. Finally, some sources were never
mentioned by the parties yet appear in the court’s
opinion. These authorities are endogenous—they
spring from the court itself.
In a perfect adversarial world, the percentage of sticky
citations in courts’ opinions would be something
approaching 100%. The parties would discuss the
relevant authorities in their briefs, and the court would
rely on the same authorities in its decisionmaking.
Spoiler alert: our adversarial world is imperfect.
Endogenous citations abound in judicial opinions and
parties’ briefs are brimming with unsticky citations.
So we crunched the numbers. We analyzed 325 cases
decided by the federal courts of appeals. Of the 7552
cited cases in those opinions, more than half were
never mentioned in the parties’ briefs. But there’s
more—in the article, you’ll learn how many of the
23,479 cited cases in the parties’ briefs were sticky
and how many were unsticky. You’ll see the stickiness
data sliced and diced in numerous ways: by circuit, by
case topic, by an assortment of characteristics of the
authoring judge. Read on!
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This article is an empirical study of what we call citation
stickiness. A citation is sticky if it appears in one of the parties’
briefs and then again in the court’s opinion. If it helps, picture
the parties tossing citations in the court’s direction. Some of
those citations stick and some of them don’t. The ones that don’t
stick—that don’t appear in the court’s opinion—are unsticky.
That covers the citations in the parties’ briefs—they are either
sticky or unsticky. As for the citations in a court’s opinion, they
are either sticky—meaning that the same source was cited in at
least one brief—or they are endogenous—meaning that they
appeared for the first time in the opinion. Endogenous citations
spring from the court itself.
Consider a recent Tenth Circuit opinion in which the court
cited thirty-three distinct cases.1 Thirty-one of those cases were
not mentioned in any of the parties’ briefs. The opening brief
cited twenty-nine cases,2 the response brief cited eighteen,3 and
the reply brief cited five.4 Out of all of the cases cited by the
parties, however, the Tenth Circuit cited one from the opening
brief, one from the response brief, and thirty-one that were not
mentioned in any brief. On the other end of the spectrum,
consider a recent opinion from the Seventh Circuit.5 The court’s
opinion contains eleven unique case citations. Every single one
of those eleven cases had been cited in one or more of the
parties’ briefs.6
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 36 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

1. Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017).
2. Corrected Brief of Petitioners, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-8028), 2016 WL 4010431, at ii–iii.
3. Brief of Appellee, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 168028), 2016 WL 5899579, at ii–iii.
4. Reply Brief of Petitioners, Garling v. U.S. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2017) (No.
16-8028), 2016 WL 6247387, at ii. To be clear, there weren’t fifty-two distinct cases cited
in the three briefs. Some cases were cited in more than one brief (for example, a case cited
in both the opening and response briefs).
5. Geiger v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2017).
6. In Geiger, the Westlaw-generated tables of authorities reported that the opening brief
cited thirty-six cases, the response brief cited sixty cases, and the reply brief cited thirteen
cases. See the tables of authorities tabs associated to the following documents: Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, 2016 WL 4254468, Brief of Defendant-Appellee, 2016 WL 5369221,
and Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, 2016 WL 5461992. Our method for determining
the number of cases cited in briefs and opinions is described in Part II of this article, infra.
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7. Two out of thirty-three is 6.06%.
8. One out of twenty-nine is 3.45%.
9. Eleven out of eleven is 100%.
10. Of the cases cited in that appeal’s opening brief, about 17% were sticky and 83%
were unsticky. (Six of the 36 cases from the opening brief were later cited in the Geiger
opinion. Six out of 36 is 16.67%.)
11. Using our terminology, we’d say there is wide variation in the percentage of case
citations in judicial opinions that are sticky and endogenous.
12. See infra note 110.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 37 Side A

For the Tenth Circuit case, we’d say that the cited cases in
the opinion were 6% sticky and 94% endogenous.7 We’d say
that the cited cases in the opening brief were about 3% sticky
and 97% unsticky.8 For the Seventh Circuit case, the opinion
contained 100% sticky case citations.9 None of the cases cited in
the opinion were endogenous.10
From those numbers alone, we cannot tell you whether the
briefs in the Tenth Circuit case are better or worse than the
briefs in the Seventh Circuit case. We cannot tell you whether
the Tenth Circuit’s decision is better or worse than the Seventh
Circuit’s decision. But what we can tell you is that there is wide
variation in the percentage of cited cases in judicial opinions that
originated in the parties’ briefs.11 The other thing we can tell you
is that parties cite a lot of cases in their briefs that are never
discussed in the resulting judicial opinions. Maybe you had
some general sense of this already. Maybe not. But we bet you
don’t know the numbers. We do.
We traced the provenance of 7552 cited cases in 325
federal appellate opinions. We know how many of those case
citations were borrowed from the parties’ briefs and how many
came from within the court itself. Read on to learn specifics, but
here’s a spoiler: most of the cases cited in the federal appellate
opinions that we studied were not cited in either of the parties’
briefs.
This result surprised us, as it surprised the participants in
our online and conference-audience polls.12 This finding is
novel, as most citation-practice studies of judicial opinions do
not trace the origins of the cited authorities. Studies that have
tracked the communication of citations from the briefs to the
resulting opinions have used smaller sample sizes and have been
limited to only a few courts.
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I. WHY [READ A] STUDY [ABOUT] CITATION STICKINESS?
So why should we study citation stickiness? Or, more
saliently at this point, why should you read our study about
citation stickiness? Most critically, our study is novel. It fills a
heretofore unfilled gap. While filling a gap may be a necessary
reason to undertake a study, it is not itself a sufficient one. There
are plenty of things that haven’t been studied simply because

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 37 Side B

Additionally, we tracked the journeys of the 23,479 cases
that the parties deemed worthy of citing in their briefs. We know
how many of those cited cases later showed up in the resulting
judicial opinions and how many did not.
Are there some characteristics that correlate with increased
or decreased citation stickiness? Do some circuits tend to
produce opinions with higher citation stickiness than others? Do
some types of cases tend to result in higher citation stickiness?
Do some judicial characteristics tend to correlate with higher
citation stickiness? Fear not—we have sliced and diced the data
in numerous ways.
And what does it all mean? That is a little less clear. Is it a
problem that most of the cases cited in the opinions weren’t
mentioned by the parties? Yes, we’d say that these results
indicate that something is amiss in our adversarial system. But
where to point the finger? At attorneys for submitting shoddy
briefs? At courts for disregarding the papers filed by the parties?
Don’t worry, dear reader, we devote an entire section to
hypothesizing.
What follows are the results of our empirical study of
citation stickiness in the federal courts of appeals. In Part I, we
review the existing literature on citation studies and explain why
studying citation stickiness is a worthwhile endeavor. In Part II,
we lay out our research methodology. Part III reports our results,
analyzing stickiness by various dimensions, such as case topic
and certain characteristics of the authoring judges. Finally, Part
IV hypothesizes what it all may mean and identifies some
additional avenues for future research.

12/10/2019 14:38:26
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they are not worth studying.13 Aside from its novelty, citation
stickiness is worth studying because it provides a window into
judicial decisionmaking. Judges often lament the quality of
attorneys’ briefs. Attorneys often lament the quality of judges’
decisions, especially when the opinions explaining those
decisions veer away from the issues set forth in the briefs.
Measuring citation stickiness will help uncover to what extent
judges are conducting independent legal research. Answering
that question seems foundational to determining whether judges
are doing too much research, too little, or just the right amount.
This Part will proceed with a summary of the citation
studies to date and identify the precise gap that our study fills. It
will then discuss the utility of studying citation stickiness.
A. Review of the Citation-Study Literature

12/10/2019 14:38:26

13. And there are a few things that have been studied even though they weren’t worth
studying.
14. And, yes, that is even the case for the one of us who previously authored an
empirical citation study. See Kevin Bennardo, Testing the Geographical Proximity
Hypothesis: An Empirical Study of Citations to Nonbinding Precedents by Indiana
Appellate Courts, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 125 (2015).
15. For example, one article, which is itself more than a decade old, cites over fifty
previous citation studies as background. Dietrich Fausten, Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth,
A Century of Citation Practice on the Supreme Court of Victoria, 31 MELB. U. L. REV.
733, 735–36 nn.12–20 (2007). We won’t do the same here—but surely there are plenty of
citation-practice studies to be found.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 38 Side A

While it would be nice to say that we were experts on the
citation-study literature before this project began, that would not
be the whole truth.14 We had not read every citation study out
there and thoughtfully noticed a gap in the citation stickiness
department. Rather, as many researchers do, we started with the
question and discovered the gap. We thought citation stickiness
was interesting, but when we researched it, we found little data
that answered the question of whether courts generally stick to
the legal authorities cited by the parties.
To be sure, there are plenty of citation-practice studies out
there.15 Many answer quite interesting questions. Given the
laborious nature of the research, however, many of the studies
are quite limited in scope. Many have small datasets or focus on
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a particular year or narrow band of years.16 Many are limited to
studying the courts of a particular state or territory.17 On the
federal side, these citation studies disproportionately focus on
the United States Supreme Court.18 Despite the quantity of
existing citation studies, there have been numerous calls for
expansion of this method of research.19
Citation studies have largely focused exclusively on courts’
opinions and ignored citation provenance. Studies have analyzed
whether courts cite the same scholarship that academics do20 and

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

16. Id. at 736 (“Because of the financial cost of collecting large datasets, most studies
have focused on citation practice within a single year or a few select years.”).
17. E.g., A. Michael Beaird, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts,
1950–2000, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 301 (2003); William H. Manz, The Citation
Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1273
(2001); Joseph A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas
Court of Appeals, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 120 (1998); Fritz Snyder, The Citation
Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT. L. REV. 453 (1996); James Leonard,
An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990, 86
LAW LIBR. J. 129 (1994); Richard A. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A
Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 39 (1979); John Henry Merryman, Toward
a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977).
18. E.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Raizel Liebler &
June Liebert, Something Rotten in the State of Legal Citation: The Life Span of a United
States Supreme Court Citation Containing an Internet Link (1996–2010), 15 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 273 (2013); Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and
Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489; Jules Gleicher, The Bard at the Bar: Some
Citations of Shakespeare by the United States Supreme Court, 26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
327 (2001).
19. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary
Study, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1251, 1277–78 (2008); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381, 381–83 (2000).
20. See Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles? 71 CHI-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996).
Academics tend to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to citations to legal
scholarship relative to other types of authorities. See, e.g., Derek Simpson & Lee
Petherbridge, An Empirical Study of the Use of Legal Scholarship in Supreme Court
Trademark Jurisprudence, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2014); Brent E. Newton, Law
Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century Supreme Court Justices: An
Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge,
The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1345 (2011); Lou J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the
Supreme Court: 1971–1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009 (2000); Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter,
Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of
Canada, 1985–1990, 16 DALHOUSIE L.J. 377 (1993).

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A
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how precedents are transmitted from court to court.21 But few
have compared the sources cited in the parties’ briefs to the
sources cited in the resulting opinions, perhaps because this is a
question that is likely more interesting to practitioners than to
academics.22 With a notable exception or two, the studies that
have previously compared briefs’ citations to opinions’ citations
have been extremely limited in scope.23 The existing studies are
summarized below.
1. Study of Citation Stickiness in the State Courts
The most robust citation stickiness study to date is Thomas
Marvell’s state-court study from over forty years ago. The court,
however, was anonymous. All we know is that it was the
“supreme court of a northern industrial state,” referred to by Dr.
Marvell as the “focal court” of his study.24 The Marvell dataset
comprised 112 cases argued during a one-year period ending in
June 1972.25 Comparing the attorneys’ submissions to the
opinions, Dr. Marvell found that “[a] little less than half the
legal authorities cited in the majority and minority opinions in
the 112 focal cases studied here were mentioned in the parties’
briefs or oral arguments, and but one-sixth of the authorities

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 39 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

21. E.g., Iain Carmichael, James Wudel, Michael Kim & James Jushchuk, Comment,
Examining the Evolution of Legal Precedent through Citation Network Analysis, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 227 (2017); Bennardo, supra note 14; Russell Smyth & Vinod Mishra, The
Transmission of Legal Precedent Across the Australian State Supreme Courts over the
Twentieth Century, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (2011).
22. See Cross, supra note 19, at 1272 (heralding briefs as “a heretofore underutilized
tool of empirical research”). Even some studies that have included data regarding the
sources cited in the parties’ briefs and the resulting opinions have failed to compare the two
datasets to determine the extent to which the parties’ citations influence the court’s
citations. See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1018, 1025 tbl.2, 1030 tbl.4 (1996). Other studies have compared the language used in
briefs and opinions, but specifically excluded the citation from comparison. See, e.g.,
Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties’
Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468, 471 (2008) (noting methodology of skipping citations in a
study using plagiarism software to compare language in briefs and opinions).
23. This statement isn’t meant to be critical. Most of these studies were primarily
studying other things.
24. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 6 (1978).
25. Id.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B
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26. Id. at 132 (endnote omitted). Oral argument did not add much in the way of new
authorities—Dr. Marvell found that only 1% of the parties’ authorities were mentioned at
oral argument and not in briefs. Id. at 133. We note here that Dr. Marvell served up the
data several different ways, see, e.g., id. at 132–36, and we recommend reading his study in
full.
27. Id. at 134–36, 135 n.18.
28. Id.at 134–35.
29. Id. at 135–36.
30. Id. at 135.
31. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Our New Judicial Establishment: The Record of the First
Year, 4 RUTGERS L. REV. 353, 361 (1950).

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B

mentioned by the attorneys were cited in the opinions.”26 As a
sort of control study, Dr. Marvell also compared the citations in
the published opinions and briefs of thirty civil cases from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.27 His
results were fairly consistent with the focal court study: 55% of
the authorities cited by the Sixth Circuit in those cases were first
mentioned in the briefs.28
Combining his data with interviews with judges and court
staff, Dr. Marvell concluded that courts generally do a lot of
independent legal research, although the exact amount seemed
to vary quite a bit from chambers to chambers.29 He noted that
several of the focal court justices’ law clerks “said that they used
the briefs hardly at all or only as a place to begin the research
when writing draft opinions or memorandums. The law clerks
or, increasingly, the staff attorneys do the great bulk of the
research.”30
The other existing citation-stickiness study of a state court
focused on the citation of New Jersey cases in the appellate
courts of New Jersey. In an effort to bring attention to the
deficiencies of the state bar, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court asked the sergeants-at-arms of the state supreme
court and the appellate division “to go through our opinions and
the briefs on every appeal that has been decided over the past
year and to note the New Jersey decisions in the opinions that
are not cited in the briefs.”31 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice did
not report the data in a way that would allow us to calculate the
actual stickiness rate. Instead, he highlighted the fact that 82%
of the opinions of the state supreme court and 41% of the
opinions of the intermediate appellate court cited to at least one
New Jersey case that was not mentioned in the briefs. In the

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A
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Chief Justice’s view, this was enough to show “how deficient a
large portion of the briefs filed in our appellate courts are in
point of law and what a burden of independent research they
impose on the judges.”32
2. Study of Citation Stickiness in the Federal Courts
Aside from the Marvell study mentioned in the last
subsection, the next most sizable study of citation stickiness to
date was William Manz’s study of the Supreme Court. Mr.
Manz compared the decisional authorities cited in the briefs to
those cited in the Supreme Court’s eighty majority opinions
during its 1996 term.33 On the issue of citation stickiness, he
found that 74.5% of the decisional authorities cited in the
Court’s opinions were also cited in one or more of the briefs.34
Mr. Manz thus surmised that “roughly one-quarter of the Court’s
case citations resulted from its own research.”35 Relatively few
of the cases from the briefs were later cited by the majority
opinion—only about 25%.36
In a self-described “brief” study, Professor Cross assessed
Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to precedent by examining the
opinions that the Chief Justice authored in his first term.37 As
part of the examination, Professor Cross looked at how often
Chief Justice Roberts cited the same cases that had been cited in
the parties’ briefs.38 The sample size was small: only nine
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

32. Id.
33. William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative
Study, 94 L. LIBR. J. 267, 267–68 (2002). The Manz study included citations to judicial
opinions and administrative decisions, but excluded citations to constitutions, statutes, and
regulations. Id. at 268.
34. Id. at 271 tbl.5 (reporting that, of the 1915 authorities cited in the Court’s opinions,
1427 were first cited in a brief). Of the 1915 citations in the Court’s opinions, 146 (or
7.6%) appeared first in an amicus brief and not in any of the parties’ briefs. Id. at 272
tbl.7.
35. Id. at 271.
36. See id. at 271, 272 tbl.6. The Manz study includes a number of other worthwhile
data points, including citation-stickiness data for numerous types of secondary authorities,
and we commend it to you in full.
37. Cross, supra note 19, at 1251. All the cases were published in 2005 and 2006. See
id. at 1274 nn.146–54.
38. Id. at 1273.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B
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cases.39 In the briefs for the nine cases, he found that 168 cases
had been cited by both parties.40 Professor Cross also noted that
“[o]ne might think that if both parties relied on the case, it
would be an unavoidable citation for the Court’s opinion.”41
That did not turn out to be so. Of the 168 cases cited by both
parties, only seventy-eight of them (a little over 46%) appeared
in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions.42 By aggregating some of
the data reported in the Cross study, it appears that the nine
Roberts opinions cited a total of 305 cases,43 of which 124 (over
40%) were not mentioned in either party’s briefs. Professor
Cross concludes that “[i]t seems plain that Justice Roberts
exercised considerable discretion in choosing which precedents
to cite.”44
While much narrower in scope than the Manz study,
Professor Cross’s observations from Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinions demonstrate a much lower rate of citation stickiness
than did Manz’s study of the broader court. Other researchers
have attempted to measure the stickiness of specific types of
authorities at the Supreme Court, including its citations to legal
periodicals,45 its rate of “interpretation” of legal authorities,46

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 40 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

39. Id. at 1274 tbl.3 (“Opinion Citations Compared with Briefs”).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1273.
42. Id. at 1274 tbl.3.
43. We arrived at this number by summing the middle four columns of Table 3 in the
Cross article. See id. This result is at odds, however, with Professor Cross’s earlier claim
that Chief Justice Roberts cited an average of twenty-seven cases per opinion, id. at 1268,
which would result in the citation of only 243 cases in nine opinions. In any event, Chief
Justice Roberts got a substantial proportion of his cited cases from somewhere other than
the parties’ briefs.
44. Id. at 1274.
45. Professor Newland’s study focused on the citation of legal periodicals by individual
Supreme Court Justices from 1924 through 1956. Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals
and the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (1959). In one portion
of his study, he identified the thirteen Justices who most frequently cited legal periodicals.
Id. at 480 tbl.3 (“Totals of Articles Cited by 13 Justices Who Have Most Frequently Cited
Legal Periodicals”). Although Professor Newland himself did not total the data, the upshot
is that of the 1453 articles cited by the Justices, only 262 of them had appeared in the briefs
(approximately 18%). In majority opinions, the percentage of articles cited in the opinion
that had appeared in the briefs was a little over 20% (199 of 958). In concurring opinions,
the percentage was highest at a little over 23% (22 of 94). And for dissenting opinions, the
percentage was lowest at only a little over 10% of the cited articles coming from the briefs
(41 of 401). Professor Newland did not draw many conclusions from this data, but did note
that Justice Brandeis’s citations of many articles not mentioned in the briefs “reflects
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and its use of legislative history.47 Because the Supreme Court is
a judicial body that is uniquely not bound by the traditional
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Brandeis’s well-known practice of completing considerable original research in preparation
of his opinions.” Id. at 480. The Newland study shows that Justice Brandeis cited 127
articles, only five of which appeared in the briefs. Id. at 480 tbl.3.
46. Professors Spriggs and Hansford studied how the Supreme Court “chose to legally
interpret the set of available Supreme Court precedents” in the 1991 and 1995 terms. James
F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Incorporation and
Interpretation of Precedent, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139, 139 (2002). Importantly, the authors
focused on which precedents the Court elected to “interpret,” not on the Court’s mere
citation of precedents. Id. at 146. The authors noted that the Court may deal with a
precedent in “three basic ways”: positively interpret it (by relying on it), negatively
interpret it (by distinguishing, limiting, or overruling it), or not legally interpret it. Id. at
141. To identify the world of precedents that the Court could potentially interpret, the
authors “assumed that the available set of precedents in a case consisted of the Supreme
Court cases referred to in its briefs.” Id. at 145. The authors noted all of the Supreme Court
cases that the parties had cited in their briefs and found that there were approximately sixty
potential “precedents” that the Court could interpret in each case. Id. Thus, the authors’
focus was not comparing the cases cited in the parties’ briefs to the cases cited in the
Court’s opinions; rather, their focus was comparing the cases cited in the parties’ briefs to
the cases actually “interpreted” in the Court’s opinions. The authors relied on Shepard’s
Citations to determine whether a cited case was actually “interpreted” by the Court. Id. at
146.
The results were quite low: the Court “interpreted” only 2.3% of the cases cited in
the parties’ briefs. Id. at 149–50 (reporting that the Court interpreted 250 out of 10,842
possible precedents). The authors opined that this result may be the product of attorneys’
adopting a “scattershot” approach of citing many precedents in their briefs, “many of
which are not particularly relevant to the case at hand.” Id. at 150 n.16. Stripping out the
irrelevant precedents, the authors found that the Court “interpreted” a little over 15% of the
legally relevant precedents. Id. at 151. One of the more interesting (to us) tidbits was
relegated to a footnote: the Court analyzed twenty-six precedents that were absent from the
parties’ briefs, meaning that something like 10% of the cases that the Court “interpreted”
were not even mentioned by the parties. Id. at 145 n.4.
The authors later updated the study using a revised methodology. See THOMAS G.
HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 93–108 (2006). In the revised study, the authors conceded that their earlier
approach of defining the world of potential precedent as only the authorities cited in the
parties’ briefs was “underinclusive,” as evidenced by the fact “that such a research design
misses approximately 10% of all cases actually interpreted by the Court.” Id. at 95–96. In
the revised study, the authors defined the world of potential precedent much more
expansively: as all of the cases orally argued at the Supreme Court since 1946. Id. at 96.
47. Professor Parrillo examined the use of legislative history as a tool of statutory
interpretation in judicial decisions. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive
Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History,
1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013). Specifically, he sought to track the path by which
legislative history went from being a permissible tool of statutory interpretation to a
“normal, routine, and expected” one. Id. at 274. Using statutory-interpretation cases
decided by the Supreme Court from 1940 to 1945, he compared citations to legislative
history in the briefs to those in the resulting opinions. Id. at 281. Although Professor
Parrillo’s focus was demonstrating the quantity of citations to legislative history that the
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system of precedents, studying it provides a skewed perspective
into judicial decisionmaking writ large.
In another notable study that touched on citation stickiness,
a trio of researchers investigated the effectiveness of using
automated content analysis as a research methodology in legal
scholarship.48 Although they were “focused primarily on
validating [their] methodology, rather than on the results it
generates,” they noted that they managed to “generate[]
intriguing results that suggest avenues for further study.”49 In
other words, the citation-stickiness data was but a happy
collateral byproduct of the actual focus of the study.
One area at which the trio aimed their automated content
analysis was a citation study of First Circuit opinions.50 As a
way to measure “judicial responsiveness,” the researchers
“assessed the relationship between the briefs and the opinions in
terms of authorities upon which both relied.”51 The researchers
stated that “a court’s resort to the same authorities as relied upon
by the parties seems almost necessarily to be coextensive with a
responsive analysis.”52 With a sample size of thirty First Circuit
opinions, the authors found that only 35% of the authorities
cited by the court were cited in either party’s brief.53
Conversely, only about 16% of the authorities cited in the
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Court received in briefs filed by the federal government, id. at 281–82, he uncovered some
data regarding citation stickiness in this slender area. In the cases involving briefs from the
federal government, his research showed that
22% of the citations [to legislative history in the Court’s opinions] matched both
the federal brief and at least one non-federal brief (such as the brief of a private
party or state government); 33% of the citations matched the federal brief and no
other brief; 10% of the citations matched at least non-federal brief but not the
federal brief; and 24% of the citations matched no brief (suggesting they arose
from the Court’s own research).
Id. at 317. In cases with no federal-government briefs, Professor Parrillo found that “45%
of the citations to legislative history appeared in at least one of the briefs, while 55% did
not (suggesting they came from the Court’s own research).” Id. at 318. Parrillo then
hypothesized about the factors that gave rise to the Court’s ability to conduct so much
internal research into legislative history. Id. at 361–64.
48. Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating
Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the
Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2012).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1232–39.
51. Id. at 1232.
52. Id. at 1234.
53. Id. at 1238.
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parties’ briefs were cited by the court.54 Although the
researchers were focused on methodology rather than results,
they found the citation-analysis results “intriguing in their own
right” and suggested further study.55 Similar to Professor
Cross’s observation that Chief Justice Roberts did not confine
himself to the sources cited in the parties’ briefs, these
researchers observed that “judges have, and exercise, a
considerable amount of discretion in choosing which precedent
to follow.”56
B. The Utility of Studying Citation Stickiness

12/10/2019 14:38:26

54. Id.
55. Id. at 1238–39 (noting it was “striking how little overlap there is between the
parties’ citations and the court’s”).
56. Id. at 1239. Additionally, the Marvell state-court study contains a limited citationstickiness analysis of Sixth Circuit opinions from the 1970s. See supra Section I.A.1.
57. See Newland, supra note 45; Parrillo, supra note 47.
58. See, e.g., Newland, supra note 45; HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 46; Spriggs
& Hansford, supra note 46; Cross, supra note 19; Parrillo, supra note 47.
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As chronicled above, previous comparison studies of
citations in briefs and resulting opinions are spotty, scattered,
and often aged. They are limited in scope. Some deal only with
citations to authorities other than cases.57 Many focus on the
United States Supreme Court.58 Most have very small sample
sizes. Thus, there is a gap in the literature. But is it a gap worth
filling?
We think it is. More accurately, we thought it was. And
then we partially filled it with this article. Now we’ll attempt to
convince you that we spent our efforts wisely.
First, there is the incomplete, but interesting, story told by
the data reported above. Although the previous citation
stickiness studies are spotty and limited, there is one common
thread: they consistently indicate that a substantial proportion of
the authorities cited in courts’ opinions were not cited in the
parties’ briefs. A larger and more comprehensive study was
needed to validate those findings.
Second, data on judicial decisionmaking aids brief writers.
There have been an increasing number of calls for more
empirical research into judicial decisionmaking. Although there
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is much conventional wisdom (some of which conflicts with
other conventional wisdom), there is relatively little evidence on
what affects judicial decisionmaking.59 For example, there is a
foundational perception that the parties’ briefs are important, but
we don’t actually know to what extent that is true, nor do we
have a good sense of what makes some briefs more persuasive
than others.60 Identifying the factors that increase judicial
responsiveness can help attorneys write briefs that are more
likely to prompt relevant discussion by the court.61
Third, data on citation stickiness can help shape debates
over the process of resolving disputes in our judicial system.62
On the one hand, some judges have vocally expressed a belief
that attorneys’ briefs are largely deficient and generally
unhelpful.63 They complain that attorneys do not write well and,
worse, fail to discuss the controlling precedents.64 On the other
hand, some attorneys and commentators have decried
shortcomings in the quality of judicial decisions, and
particularly have complained about judicial attempts at
decisionmaking without the benefit of the parties’ input.65 The
most robust literature debates to what extent judges may or

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 42 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

59. See, e.g., Ted Becker, What We Still Don’t Know About What Persuades Judges—
And Some Ways We Might Find Out, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 41, 41–43 (2018).
60. Attempts at empirically assessing the effect of briefs have increased in recent years.
See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical Relationship
Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment Success, 22 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 61
(2018); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946–
2013, 86 MISS. L.J. 105 (2017); Adam Feldman, Counting on Quality: The Effects of
Merits Brief Quality on Supreme Court Decisions, 94 DENV. L. REV. 43 (2016).
61. See Oldfather et. al, supra note 48, at 1218–19 (“One could imagine, for example,
large-scale analysis of the relationships among briefs and opinions generating information
about the relative utility of briefing practices and approaches.”).
62. See id. at 1217–18.
63. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, supra note 31, at 361 (“[F]our out of five of all the briefs
submitted to us are of inferior quality.”); Stephen L. Wasby, As Seen From Behind the
Bench: Judges’ Commentary on Lawyers’ Competence, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 47, 61–68
(2013) (reporting judges’ negative reactions to briefs).
64. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, supra note 31, at 361; Wasby, supra note 63, at 61–62
(recounting judicial reaction to the omission of a key case from the briefing).
65. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 972 (2009) (“Other times, the court will resolve
the case by employing legal reasoning and citing legal authorities not suggested by the
parties—which means that the parties were never able to challenge or criticize the legal
reasoning that drove the court’s decision. . . . This can lead to mistakes that the parties
might have caught if given a chance.” (footnote omitted)).
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should engage in independent factual research outside of the
record.66 But some commentators are equally critical of sua
sponte rulings on issues not briefed by the parties, and of courts
basing their decisions on precedents that the parties did not
brief.67 If judges are restricted from independently researching
facts, should they be similarly restricted from independently
researching law? If not, why not?68
In short, judges are skeptical of attorneys’ ability to be
helpful, but attorneys are equally skeptical of judges’ ability to
make sound decisions without their help. Trust is lacking on
both sides. This article won’t resolve this issue. Instead, its
contribution is data. This article will tell you what proportion of

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 43 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

66. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits independent judicial research of
“facts.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 478 (2017); CHARLES
GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.04, 5-24 (5th ed. 2013)
(“Independent factual investigation impairs the function of an adversarial system by
allowing a judge to craft decisions on the basis of facts that may be unknown to one or both
of the parties and therefore indisputable by them regardless of their accuracy or relevance.”
(footnote omitted)). Of course, that leaves open to debate what is “fact” and what is not.
See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1264–71 (2012); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical
Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 148–57 (2008); David L. Faigman,
Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 551–56 (1991); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV.
877, 880–82 (1988); Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out. . .”: An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1539–42 (1987); John Monahan
& Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–95 (1986).
67. See Michael J. Donaldson, Justice in Full is Time Well Spent: Why the Supreme
Court Should Ban Sua Sponte Dismissals, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 43 (2017) (“When a
court decides sua sponte, it is deciding without input of the people who know the most
about the case—the parties and their counsel. This increases the likelihood that the court
will miss some relevant statute, precedent, fact, or argument in making its decision.”
(footnotes omitted)); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 313 (2002) (arguing
that decisions rendered without input from the parties should carry less precedential weight
than dicta); but see Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009)
(defending the practice of federal judges injecting new legal issues into the cases before
them).
68. One answer may be that legal precedent is passed from case to case, but factual
determinations are not. See Frost, supra note 67, at 493 (“Just as it is important for courts
to respect stare decisis, it is essential that litigants not be allowed to slip its bonds simply
by refusing to cite established precedent.”); see also GEYH ET AL., supra note 66, at § 5.04,
5-25 (“Whereas judges are not presumptively experts on questions of fact, they are experts
on matters of law who are charged with the duty of declaring what the law is.”).
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cited cases the federal courts of appeals are getting from the
parties’ briefs. We will not tell you whether that number is too
few, too many, or just right. But future debate should be
grounded in data, not in anecdote and perception.
II. OUR METHODOLOGY
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Now let’s talk about how we did it. For our dataset, we
targeted recent published opinions of the federal courts of
appeals. We selected the federal courts of appeals for a few
reasons. First, we wanted to focus on federal rather than state
courts. We figured that briefs filed in federal courts would be
more easily accessible than many briefs filed in state courts, and,
to be frank, we did not want to limit our audience by focusing on
any particular state.
Second, we knew that we did not want to focus our study
on the United States Supreme Court. It is unique and therefore
unrepresentative of courts in general. It is also over-studied
relative to other courts, particularly considering its small
caseload. And because it is not bound by precedent, it makes a
poor subject for a study that touches on the communication of
precedent.
So that left federal district courts and federal courts of
appeals. Because appellate cases follow a more consistent
briefing lifecycle, it is simply easier to construct a consistent
dataset out of appellate cases than trial cases. Appellate cases
often progress along the same path: opening brief, response
brief, and (maybe) reply brief. These briefs tend to be formal
and contain tables of authorities. Trial cases can involve
numerous types of motions, some of which are briefed and some
of which are not, and perhaps even a trial. In the federal district
courts, briefs tend to vary more in length, consistency, and
formality. Also, many lack tables of authorities. Thus, in order
to more easily construct a consistent dataset, we opted for the
federal courts of appeals.
To create a broad sample and avoid focusing on a single
circuit that might turn out to be an outlier, we sampled cases
from each of the thirteen federal courts of appeals. We also
thought it would be interesting to have some data from every
circuit because we could then compare each circuit to the others.
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Beyond that, we wanted to capture a random assortment of
recent cases. Why recent? Because we wanted our data to be as
current as possible.
We wanted to capture cases in which a full opinion resulted
from adversarial briefing. Thus, we excluded unpublished
opinions, per curiam opinions, and memorandum opinions. We
figured that these opinions were more likely to be short, to cite
few authorities, or to contain sections that were cut and pasted
from a court’s stockpile of generic language. Instead, we limited
our dataset to only authored, published opinions.
As for briefs, we limited our dataset to cases in which the
briefs were available on Westlaw. We also excluded cases in
which there were supplemental briefs or amicus briefs. We
sought to capture truly mine-run cases: those that progressed
along the traditional pathway of opening brief, response brief,
and (maybe) reply brief.69
We generated our dataset by identifying the first twentyfive cases from each circuit to meet our research criteria.70 First
we would verify that the briefing in the case met our criteria and
that the briefs were available on Westlaw.71 If the briefs met our
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69. Cases with amended briefs were not disqualified because an amended brief is not an
additional brief.
70. In this context, “we” means “us,” not “our research assistants.” We created separate
spreadsheets for each of the thirteen circuits, which we called “circuit spreadsheets.” Here
are the steps to creating a circuit spreadsheet. First, from the Westlaw main screen at
https://www.westlaw.com/, select “Cases” under the “All Content” tab. Next, under
“Federal Cases by Circuit,” select the desired circuit (e.g., “1st Circuit”). On the next page,
select the court of appeals (e.g., “First Circuit Court of Appeals”). This leads to a database
of that court’s cases. Within that database, restrict the results to those starting in 2017 by
entering the following search: “advanced: DA(aft 12-31-2016 & bef 01-01-2018).” Then,
under “Reported Status,” click the filter for only “Reported” cases. Then sort the results by
date and go to the end of the search results to begin the screening process with the oldest
opinion, which will be the opinion closest in time to January 1, 2017. (Note that these
instructions were created during the latter half of 2017 and may no longer hold true after
the conversion to Westlaw Edge.)
71. The first criterion used to disqualify cases was whether the briefs were available on
Westlaw because we found through experience that this was the most likely piece to be
missing. So, after accessing the court’s opinion on Westlaw, we would click on the
“Filings” tab to see which filings were available. Often the filings would lead to
disqualification either because there were too few briefs available on Westlaw or because
there were supplemental, amicus, or other additional briefs. If the briefing was very
straightforward (e.g., Westlaw displayed only an opening, responsive, and reply brief) we
ended our briefing investigation there. If the briefing was potentially within the bounds of
our parameters but the filings available on Westlaw raised some suspicions (e.g., there was
an opening and responsive brief but no reply brief or there were duplicate or amended
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criteria, we would turn our attention to the court’s opinion and
verify that it was an authored, published opinion. For each
circuit, we’d take the first twenty-five cases of 2017 that met
those criteria.72 Although not randomized from a larger dataset,
this approach comports with the methodology used previously
by others.73 For some circuits it was relatively easy to find cases
that met our criteria. For others, we had to assess hundreds of
opinions to find twenty-five. Given the variation in the number
of published cases issued by each court of appeals and the wide
variation in the coverage of briefs available on Westlaw, each
circuit’s dataset has a unique span of dates.74 For eight of the
thirteen circuits, we were able to assemble our twenty-five cases
from those issued by the end of March 2017. Thus, our dataset
overwhelmingly comprises cases from the first half, and mostly
the first quarter, of 2017.75 In all, our dataset comprises 325
cases—far more than any previous study of citation stickiness.76
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versions of briefs), then we investigated the court’s docket using the “Dockets Search”
feature of Bloomberg Law’s “Litigation Intelligence Center.” See Litigation Intelligence
Center, BLOOMBERG LAW ((June 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com. For
example, we would check to verify that there really was no reply brief filed in the case. If it
turned out that there was a reply brief, but Westlaw did not have a copy, then the case
would be disqualified from our dataset. Additionally, in the cases that aroused our
suspicions, we verified whether the parties filed additional briefs (and, if so, disqualified
the case from our dataset).
72. In the Seventh Circuit, two cases that otherwise met our criteria were excluded
because no cases were cited in the court’s opinions. See Hart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 845
F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gibbs, 845 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2017). While
Judge Posner authored both opinions, one was accompanied by two concurring opinions
that also cited no decisional authority. See Gibbs, 845 F.3d at 806 (Sykes & Kanne, JJ,
concurring in the judgment, & Kanne, J, concurring). Because our primary research focus
was determining whether the court’s case citations come from the briefs or elsewhere, we
decided that it was sensible to exclude opinions that cited no cases.
73. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 24, at 337 n.18 (describing the methodology of
selecting thirty Sixth Circuit cases to study).
74. The Eighth Circuit has the shortest range of dates—we found our twenty-five
Eighth Circuit cases between January 1, 2017, and February 2, 2017. The Third Circuit
took the largest range of dates for us to get our twenty-five cases: January 1, 2017, to July
25, 2017.
75. We considered staggering the start date of each circuit (e.g., starting the First
Circuit with cases decided on January 1, starting the Second Circuit with cases decided on
February 1, and so on). Ultimately, however, we failed to imagine any way in which
starting every circuit on the same date would skew our results. Therefore, we opted to start
every circuit on the same date for the sake of simplicity and consistency.
76. Previously, Dr. Marvell’s study from the 1970s contains the most comprehensive
comparison of citations in briefs and opinions. See supra Section I.A. The Marvell study
contained a dataset of 112 cases. See generally notes 24–30, supra, and accompanying text.
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Having assembled our dataset, we then turned to collecting
the actual citation data so that we could compare the citations in
each of the briefs with the citations in the resulting opinions. For
this task, we primarily relied on one of our research assistants.
For each case listed in each circuit spreadsheet, she used
Westlaw to download the tables of authorities of each opinion
and brief (opening, responsive, reply if any) in .docx format. At
the time we conducted this study, Westlaw’s table-of-authorities
feature captured cases cited in the opinion and briefs but not
statutes, regulations, or legislative history. Only very rarely did
the tables of authorities capture any non-decisional authority.77
Thus for each appeal listed in a circuit spreadsheet, we had three
or four lists of case citations—one list for each brief or opinion.
We then were able to compare the lists of case citations from
each brief’s table of authorities to the case citations in the other
briefs’ tables of authorities and to the cases cited in the resulting
opinions.78
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77. Other than judicial opinions, the materials that turned up in the Westlaw tables of
authorities in our dataset were decisions of administrative agencies (classified as
“Administrative Decision & Guidance”), patents (classified as “Intellectual Property”), and
a lone American Law Report annotation (classified as “Secondary Sources”). We manually
deleted the patent and ALR citations from our dataset, but we kept the citations to
administrative adjudications because they were decisional in nature. For examples, click on
Westlaw’s Table of Authorities tab for the briefs associated with the following database
identification numbers: 2016 WL 1466312, 2014 WL 5421879, and 2016 WL 7435951.
78. Although we summed the process in a single tidy sentence, the process itself was
not so streamlined. Here’s what our team did:
To mechanize the task of comparing the lists of cases, our research assistant used a
markup program to convert each .docx document into a plain text document. This process
stripped out the Westlaw formatting (including KeyCite flags), leaving each plain-text
citation on the list in its own paragraph.
Next, we used Excel spreadsheets to compare the plain-text lists of cited cases to one
another. We wrote the necessary formulas in the spreadsheets, which compared the lists of
citations to one another. Each appeal had its own spreadsheet that included five tabs: a tab
for each of the three briefs, one for the opinion, and a summary sheet tabulating citation
counts from the first three. Our research assistant pasted the lists of citations into the
spreadsheets. For example, she pasted the list of case citations from the opening brief into
column A of the first tab, then the list of case citations from the responsive brief into
column A of the second tab, and so on.
Because Westlaw’s table-of-authorities feature formatted each case citation
identically, Excel’s comparing function could search for matches across the first four tabs
in each spreadsheet. For example, the formulas in column B of the opening-brief sheet
compared each case citation in column A with all of the case citations listed in the
responsive brief, reply brief, and opinion sheets. If Excel found a match, it filled the
corresponding cell with a “1.” If it didn’t find a match, it filled the corresponding cell with
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A few words on sample size. Our 325 judicial opinions
contained 7552 unique case citations; the briefs in those 325
cases contained 23,479 unique case citations. It is, then, useful
to think in terms of citations—7552 in the opinions and 23,479
in the briefs—rather than in terms of 325 cases. Because we
tracked citations by the courts and the parties, the number of
citations is the number that matters. Our sample size wasn’t
twenty-five in each circuit, as if we looked at the briefs and
opinions in twenty-five appeals. Rather, it was the hundreds of
court-cited cases and the thousands of party-cited cases in each
set of briefs and resulting opinion. With this background in
mind, read on to learn what we found.79
III. OUR RESULTS

12/10/2019 14:38:26

a “0.” The summary sheets contained formulas that took those counts and tabulated how
many cases were in each brief or opinion, how many were in briefs but not the opinion,
how many were in one or two briefs only, how many cases were cited in both parties’
briefs and the opinion, and—of course—how many cases were cited in the opinion that
were also cited in at least one of the briefs (i.e., how many citations were sticky).
Finally, we collected all of the summary counts into a single master spreadsheet that
contained data about all 325 appeals in our datasets. With this dataset we were able to
calculate not only stickiness percentages for the appeals as a whole, but also stickiness
percentages for specific parts of the dataset by using different characteristics of the appeals
and authoring judges.
79. Although we were primarily interested in citation stickiness, we amassed data on a
variety of other fronts because we thought the results were likely to be interesting. We
coded for the information that was available on Westlaw at the outset (for example,
Westlaw’s categorization of each case’s topic and the name of the authoring judge). This
information allowed us to slice and dice the stickiness data based on the various
characteristics of each appeal.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 45 Side B

This part summarizes the results of our study and visualizes
the most important results using charts. The results focus on
measures of citation stickiness because that was our primary
question, but our study measured a few other things like average
number of cases cited per opinion, so we included non-citationstickiness results where they seemed interesting. In addition to
figuring out what the overall stickiness percentage was, we were
looking for characteristics that might have affected the number
of sticky citations in a particular opinion—perhaps the type of
appeal or the authoring judge’s level of experience. To that end,
we calculated the percentage of sticky citations of different

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A
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subsets of our data, divided by characteristic. Just to manage
your expectations, our results are primarily counting,
percentages, and averages (means). For some of the percentages
and means, we calculated 95% confidence intervals using the
Exact test in Stata.80
Our most common calculation was for citation stickiness,
which is a proportion. We calculated the proportion of sticky
cites in various subsets of briefs and opinions. A convenient
feature of citation stickiness as a measurement is that it’s easy to
calculate, as Figure 1 shows: for opinions, tally the number of
cases in an opinion also cited in at least one party’s brief, and
divide by the number of cases cited in the opinion. For briefs,
tally the number of cases in a brief also cited in the opinion, and
divide by the total number of cases cited in the brief.
Figure 1
Equations for Calculating Citation Stickiness and Super-Stickiness
Sticky cites in opinion =

௦௦௧ௗ௧ௗ௧௦௧
௦௦௧ௗ

Sticky cites in brief =
Super-sticky cites in opinion =

௦௦௧ௗௗ
௦௦௧ௗ

௦௦௧ௗௗ௧௧௦ ᇲ ௦
௦௦௧ௗ

12/10/2019 14:38:26

80. These confidence intervals are noted in footnotes when we first mention a particular
result. A confidence interval expresses the percentage probability that data lies between
two limits. See, e.g., ALAN R. JONES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND OTHER FRIGHTENING
STUFF 102 (2019).
81. If you aren’t going to read this whole article, but you are looking for a little
something to read (or cite), go for the “big picture” results.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A

This part first describes our “big picture” results: aspects of
citation stickiness within our whole dataset, including by
circuit.81 It then compares the stickiness of cases cited in
winning briefs and the stickiness of cases cited in losing briefs,
using the appeals in our dataset with clear winners and losers.
And last, it summarizes the stickiness of opinions authored by
judges with particular characteristics, including political
affiliation and experience.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 46 Side B
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A. The Big Picture: Stickiness Percentages
and Number of Cases Cited

12/10/2019 14:38:26

82. A case citation in a brief is sticky if it later appears in the court’s opinion; if it does
not appear there, then it is unsticky. A case citation in an opinion is sticky if it first
appeared in any party’s brief; if it appeared for the first time in the court’s opinion, then it
is endogenous. If you need more of a refresher, turn back to the first page of this article.
83. The 95% confidence interval = 47.8%–50.1%.
84. See infra Part IV. That’s where we speculate.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 46 Side B

Using the nomenclature we invented,82 the overall
stickiness percentage in our 325-opinion dataset was 49%.83
This means that 49% of the 7552 cases that were cited in the
courts’ opinions had been cited by at least one party in a brief.
The other 51% were endogenous—they originated from
somewhere else, most likely the courts’ own research.84 Of all
the cases cited in the 325 opinions, only 21% were cited in both
parties’ briefs. To coin some more nomenclature, we have
referred to cases that were cited in both parties’ briefs and then
again in the opinion as super sticky. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate
these overall stickiness and super-stickiness percentages of the
opinions in our dataset.
Another way of looking at the stickiness data is from the
perspective of the briefs, rather than the opinions. In our 325case dataset, the parties cited 23,479 cases. Of those, only 16%
were later cited by the courts in their opinions—or to use our
nomenclature, were sticky. And of the 4276 cases cited by both
parties in their briefs, only 38% were sticky. In other words, if a
party cited a case in a brief, there was only a 16% chance that
the court would also cite that same case—and an 84% likelihood
that the court would not mention the case. And even for a case
that both parties cited—the universe of cases that the parties
agreed were worth discussing—there was only a 38% chance
that the court would cite the case—and a 62% likelihood that the
court wouldn’t. Figure 4 illustrates the overall stickiness of
citations from the briefs in our dataset.
Note that we follow the same graphical conventions for all
our figures: solid dark gray for analysis of sticky citations in
opinions (like Figure 2), black with white dots for analysis of
super-sticky citations in opinions (like Figure 3), and white with

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 47 Side A
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black squares for analysis of sticky citations in briefs (like
Figure 4).
Figure 2
Sticky Citations in
All Opinions

Figure 4
Sticky Citations in
All Briefs

Figure 3
Super-Sticky Cases
in All Opinions







The distribution of our stickiness results, displayed in
Figure 5, is mostly bell-shaped, with the center of the bell at 51
to 60% (with 55 cases in that range) and an overall peak at 31 to
40% (with 67 cases in that range). The two cases with stickiness
of 10% or less involved briefs that cited relatively few cases (11
in one, 42 in the other). On the other end of the chart, nine
opinions contained 100% sticky citations—all of the case cites
in the opinions originated in the parties’ briefs. Those opinions
tended to include few case citations, eight citing ten cases or
fewer,85 and the last eleven. For comparison, the mean number
of cases cited per opinion in all cases was 23.2 and the mean
number cited in the parties’ briefs was 72.2.

1XPEHURI2SLQLRQV
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85. Indeed, two of the opinions cited only a single case. Both opinions were authored
by Judge Posner.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 47 Side A

Figure 5
Overall Distribution of Stickiness Percentages
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We hoped to gain a bit more insight into our overall dataset
by comparing the top and bottom quintiles of all of our
stickiness data (the opinions in the top and bottom 20% in terms
of citation stickiness). Each quintile was composed of sixty-five
opinions. The opinions in the top quintile ranged from 70% to
100% sticky, with a mean stickiness of 79%.86 The opinions in
the bottom quintile ranged from 6% to 33% sticky, with a mean
stickiness of 26%.87 On average, the opinions in the bottom
quintile cited about two-thirds the number of cases as those in
the top quintile. The bottom quintile opinions also cited more
than twice as many sticky cases as the top-quintile opinions.
Thus the least-sticky opinions cited about one and a half times
the number of cases as the stickiest opinions, but that larger
number of case cites included fewer than half the number of
cases cited by the parties as the stickiest opinions. Or, in simpler
terms: the least-sticky opinions cite a lot of cases but very few
from the briefs.
Looking at the top and bottom quintiles by number of cases
cited revealed the same pattern. The quintile of opinions in our
dataset that cited the most cases cited an average 47.5 cases and
were 45% sticky. But the quintile of opinions in our dataset that
cited the fewest cases cited an average of only 7.9 cases and
were 60% sticky.
B. Stickiness by Circuit

12/10/2019 14:38:26

86. The 95% confidence interval = 76.3%–81.2%.
87. The 95% confidence interval = 24.3%–28.6%.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B

To refresh your recollection, we analyzed citation data from
twenty-five cases in each of the thirteen circuits. Because each
circuit exists as a separate solar system of precedent, we
hypothesized that there might be some variation in the stickiness
rate among the circuits. For example, circuits may have different
cultures regarding how they approach parties’ briefs and the
authorities cited in them or different norms regarding
independent legal research. Moreover, each circuit has a nonhomogeneous pool of binding precedent. Factors such as the age
of the circuit, its case load, and its rate of publication would
influence how much binding case law is available in each

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A
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circuit.88 Differences in the quantity of available binding case
law may affect citation stickiness.
Twenty-five cases per circuit resulted in an average of 581
case citations in the opinions and an average of 1806 cited cases
in the briefs. Those data are summarized in Figures 6 and 7, but
here are the highlights: stickiness percentages ranged from
42%89 in the Third Circuit to 57%90 in the Eighth. Superstickiness percentages ranged from 16% in the Third Circuit to
31% in the D.C. Circuit. The Third Circuit also cited the highest
number of cases per opinion (31.8), double that of the Seventh
(15.9). A case cited in a party’s brief had the lowest chances of
being cited by the court in the Seventh Circuit (11%) and the
highest in the First (20%). Even though the Third Circuit
produced opinions with the lowest stickiness percentages and
the largest number of case citations, an above-average
percentage of cases cited to the Third Circuit were cited in the
opinions: 18%. (The average for all circuits and cases was 16%.)
That brings us to the average number of cases cited in the
parties’ briefs. Overall, the average set of briefs cited 72.2 cases,
more than three times the average number of cases cited by the
court (23.2). The parties in the Federal Circuit cited the fewest
cases (57.2), and parties in the Second Circuit cited the most
(92.5). For more detail by circuit, see Appendix A.








12/10/2019 14:38:26

88. For example, the Eleventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit date back only to the
early 1980s, although decisions of their predecessor courts were adopted as binding. See
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Bonnor v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207–11 (11th Cir. 1981).
89. The 95% confidence interval = 38.4%–45.3%.
90. The 95% confidence interval = 51.9%–61.4%.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A
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Figure 6
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions, by Circuit
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3HUFHQWDJHRI&LWDWLRQVLQ
2SLQLRQV

Figure 7
Percentage of Super-Sticky Citations in Opinions, by Circuit








C. Stickiness by Case Characteristics

12/10/2019 14:38:26

91. For our purposes, the distinction between civil and criminal cases was based on the
Westlaw-designated topic. Westlaw designates most opinions with both a topic and subtopic. We categorized cases as “Criminal” if their main topic was “Criminal Justice”; all
other cases were categorized as “Civil.” (There is no “civil” main topic in Westlaw;
examples of other main topics include “Copyright,” “Environmental Law,” and “Labor and
Employment.”) Using this method, habeas corpus cases are categorized as criminal.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 48 Side B

Of our 325 opinions, about two-thirds were civil (213) and
one third were criminal (112).91 Within the broad civil-criminal
divide, the 325 opinions also covered many different topics. We
hypothesized that case type could affect citation stickiness for a
variety of reasons, including the fact that the quantity of
available binding precedent would differ depending on case
type. For example, the circuits may be relatively richer in
binding precedent for civil matters (or particular types of civil
matters) when compared to criminal matters. Variations in the
amount of available binding precedent may affect citation
stickiness. Moreover, criminal prosecutions involve government
attorneys on one or both sides, whereas civil cases often involve
private attorneys on both sides. Briefs by government and
private attorneys might have different stickiness percentages, so
we hypothesized that looking at broad categories of cases could
provide a very rough proxy for this information.
As it turns out, the two categories of cases had similar
stickiness percentages, with 48% of the cases cited in civil

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 49 Side A
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opinions being sticky92 and only a slightly higher 51% of the
cases cited in criminal opinions being sticky,93 as shown in
Figure 8. The super-stickiness percentages were an identical
21%. Civil and criminal opinions also cited a similar number of
cases, civil opinions citing an average of 22.4 cases and criminal
opinions citing an average of 24.8. The parties in criminal cases
brought fewer cases to the courts’ attention, on average citing
65.9 cases in each set of briefs. On average, each set of civil
briefs cited 74.9 cases. A case cited in a criminal brief had a
higher likelihood of getting cited in the resulting opinion (19%)
than a case cited in a civil brief (14%) as shown in Figure 9,
which makes sense given similar stickiness percentages.
Figure 8
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Civil and Criminal Opinions
Civil Opinions

Criminal Opinions





Figure 9
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Civil and Criminal Briefs





12/10/2019 14:38:26

92. The 95% confidence interval = 46.4%–49.2%.
93. The 95% confidence interval = 49.2%–52.9%.

Criminal Briefs

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 49 Side A

Civil Briefs
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3HUFHQWDJH RI&LWDWLRQV
LQ2SLQLRQV

Figure 10
Opinion Stickiness by Westlaw Topic
























D. Stickiness by Type of Brief
Although so far we’ve largely reported citation-stickiness
data from the opinions perspective, we also looked at stickiness
from the perspective of the briefs. This section describes how

12/10/2019 14:38:26

94. Yes, we realize that the topic itself isn’t actually sticky. Rather, it was citations in
the briefs and opinions associated with the topic that were sticky. But hopefully you’ll
allow us a little latitude; it is our nomenclature after all.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 49 Side B

Our 325 opinions covered seventy-one different Westlaw
“topics,” ranging from Administrative Practice to Weapons.
Many of those topics were assigned to only one (Espionage) or a
few (Fraud) opinions in our dataset. We identified eight
Westlaw topics that appeared at least ten times in our dataset—
Bankruptcy, Civil Rights, Commercial Law, Government, Labor
and Employment, Litigation, Patents, and Sentencing—and
calculated stickiness percentages for each. These percentages are
summarized in Figure 10, but here are the high points. The
stickiest topic94 was Government (53%) and the least sticky was
Bankruptcy (41%). Government and Bankruptcy opinions also
had the highest and lowest percentage of super-sticky cites (28%
and 16%, respectively). But cites in Patents and Government
briefs were the least sticky (12%), and cites in Sentencing briefs
were the most sticky (21%). Patents and Sentencing briefs also
tended to cite the fewest cases (55.3 and 52.7), while
Bankruptcy and Litigation briefs cited the most (78.5 and 83.7).
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sticky the citations were in the briefs we studied.95 All 325
appeals in our dataset included an opening brief filed by the
appellant and a responsive brief filed by the appellee.96 Most of
them—295—also included a reply brief. We hypothesized that
differences in stickiness rates among the briefs could shed some
light on how much weight the briefs carried with the court; for
example, a very low stickiness percentage for reply briefs could
indicate that reply briefs are rarely worth filing.
The three types of briefs had similar percentages of cited
cases stick to the resulting opinions: 19% cited in opening
briefs, 21% cited in responsive briefs, and 21% cited in reply
briefs were sticky. Taking account of overlapping cases cited by
appellants in their opening briefs and reply briefs, 17% of cases
cited by appellants were sticky. Of cases cited by both parties’
briefs, 38% were cited in the opinions (these are the super-sticky
citations). Figure 11 shows these stickiness percentages.
Figure 11
Stickiness by Type of Brief
Opening Brief
Stickiness

Responsive Brief
Stickiness

Reply Brief
Stickiness




Opening + Reply Briefs Stickiness97

Both Parties’ Briefs Stickiness



12/10/2019 14:38:26

95. We also calculated the average number of cases cited per brief, which is potentially
interesting to some readers: responsive briefs cited the most cases, an average of 40.5.
Opening briefs cited about six fewer, an average of 34.4 cases. And reply briefs cited the
fewest cases, an average of 19.8.
Of the 40.5 cases cited in the average responsive brief, an average of 30.8 cases were
not cited in the opening briefs. Of those 30.8 cases, an average of 3.7 were cited in the
reply brief. Thus, an average of 27.1 cases introduced by the appellee were not cited by the
appellant in the reply. However, of the 3.7 cases introduced by the responsive brief and
then cited in the reply brief, 26% were later cited in the opinion.
96. In some cases, the parties were petitioners and respondents rather than appellants
and appellees, but this did not affect our analysis.
97. The “Opening + Reply Briefs” pie chart in Figure 11 shows a combined result based
on unique citations. If the appellant cited a case in both the opening brief and the reply, we
counted it only once.
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E. Stickiness by Winning and Losing Briefs
A prime candidate for Top Stickiness Influencer is
winningness. We hypothesized that opinions would cite more
cases from the winners’ briefs than the losers’ because the
opinions would be more likely to align with the winning briefs’
reasoning (although the opinions should also include some
explanation of why the losing briefs’ reasoning is flawed).
Moreover, judges may use the winning briefs as a jumping off
point when drafting the opinion. Our calculations showed that
our prediction was correct, but the effect was relatively small.
Of the 325 appeals in our dataset, 297 had a clear winner
and a clear loser; the others were more muddled (for example,
reversals- and affirmations-in-part). Of those 297 clear-result
cases, the appellant won eighty-six and the appellee won 201.
Forty-one percent98 of the cases cited in those 297 opinions were
also cited by the winning party, while only 32%99 were cited by
the loser, as illustrated by Figure 12. So our research reveals a
9% difference between the likelihood that a case cited in the
opinion came from the winning party rather than from the losing
party. Most of the cases cited by the winner were also cited by
the loser, and vice versa: 22%100 of the cases in the opinions
were cited by both parties.
Figure 12
Percentage of Sticky Citations First Cited in
Winners’ and Losers’ Briefs
Loser Cites in Opinions





Considering stickiness from the briefs perspective, 21% of
cases cited by winners in their briefs made it into the opinions,
while 17% of cases cited by losers made it into the opinions, as
illustrated by Figure 13. Of the smaller universe of cases cited

12/10/2019 14:38:26

98. The 95% confidence interval = 39.3%–41.8%.
99. The 95% confidence interval = 31.3%–33.7%.
100. The 95% confidence interval = 21.4%–23.5%.
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Winner Cites in Opinions
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by both parties in these 297 cases, 35% made it into an opinion.
Winners and losers cited about the same number of cases in their
briefs: an average of 40.2 in winners’ briefs and 39.7 in losers’
briefs.101 The appellant also cited about the same number of
cases in winning and losing reply briefs: 19.9 cases in winning
reply briefs and 18.2 cases in losing reply briefs.
Figure 13
Percentage of Sticky Citations from Winners’ Briefs
and Losers’ Briefs
Cites from Winners’ Briefs



Cites from Losers’ Briefs



F. Stickiness by Judicial Characteristics
One reason we chose to include only authored opinions in
our dataset was so that we could look at various characteristics
of the authoring judges to see if they had any effect on citation

12/10/2019 14:38:26

101. These calculations include the total number of cases cited in both the opening and
reply briefs, if both were present.
102. The 95% confidence interval = 45.4%–50.0%.
103. The 95% confidence interval = 50.1%–53.1%.
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Comparing opinions in which the appellant won to opinions
in which the appellee won, there isn’t much difference in
stickiness. Opinions in which the appellant won contained
48%102 sticky citations, and opinions in which the appellee won
contained 52%103 sticky citations. Considering stickiness from
the briefs perspective, 15% of the cases cited by winning
appellants made it into an opinion, and 16% of the cases cited by
winning appellees made it into an opinion. We did notice a
marked difference in the stickiness of cases introduced by the
appellee and then cited by the appellant in the reply brief: when
the appellant won, only 19% of those cases were cited in the
opinion, but when the appellee won, 29% of those cases were
cited in the opinion.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B
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stickiness. We hypothesized that judges likely have varying
levels of enthusiasm for outside legal research and varying
approaches to opinion writing. We further hypothesized that
some trait or combination of traits may correlate with increased
or reduced stickiness.
Our full 325-opinion dataset included thirty-four appeals
that produced multiple opinions, meaning a majority opinion
plus at least one dissenting or concurring opinion. To keep
things clean, we omitted those thirty-four opinions from our
study of the authoring judges. That left 291 opinions with
single-judge authorship.
For the judges authoring those 291 opinions, we looked at
the following characteristics: political affiliation of the
appointing President; the appointing President; the law school
that awarded the judge’s primary law degree; whether the judge
was sitting by designation;104 and various measures of
experience, including the numbers of years since the judge’s
birth, since the judge received her law degree, since the judge
became a judge, and since the judge received her current
commission.105
1. Stickiness by Political Affiliation of Appointing President

12/10/2019 14:38:26

104. Twenty opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset were authored by judges
sitting by designation—meaning they were hearing cases outside their home courts. Most
were district court judges, but four of the opinions in our dataset were authored by
appellate judges sitting by designation in circuits other than their own.
105. We gathered the judicial-characteristics data from the Federal Judicial Center’s
website. See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–present, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges.
106. Judicial ideology is the subject of numerous studies, notwithstanding the fact that
it is neither easy to define nor easy to measure. See generally Joshua B. Fischman & David
S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It? 29 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 133 (2009) (describing the theoretical problems inherent in defining “judicial
ideology” and the methodological problems inherent in measuring it).
107. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B

We hypothesized that political ideology may affect a
judges’ approach to relying on independent legal research when
drafting opinions.106 We followed the approach of previous
researchers and used the political affiliation of the President who
appointed the judge as a proxy for the judge’s ideology.107
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Of the 291 opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset, 139
were authored by judges appointed by Democratic Presidents,
and 152 were authored by judges appointed by Republican
Presidents. The stickiness of the two sets of opinions was
similar: opinions authored by Democratic-affiliated judges
contained 48%108 sticky citations, and opinions authored by
Republican-affiliated judges contained 52%109 sticky citations,
as illustrated by Figure 14.110 Twenty percent of the citations by
Democratic-affiliated judges had been cited by both parties (i.e.,
were super-sticky), and 23% of citations by Republicanaffiliated judges were super-sticky. Cases cited by both parties
had about the same likelihood of being cited by judges of either
affiliation, with 16% of cases cited by the parties appearing in
opinions by Democratic-affiliated judges and 15% appearing in
opinions by Republican-affiliated judges, as illustrated by Figure
15. Democratic-affiliated judges cited more cases per opinion—
an average of 23.6 cases—to Republican-affiliated judges’ 20.8.
Figure 14
Percentage of Sticky Citations Used in Opinions by
Democratic-Affiliated Judges and Republican-Affiliated Judges
Democratic-Affiliated





Republican-Affiliated
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L.J. 2155, 2168 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997); see also Fischman & Law, supra note
106, at 167 (“The most popular proxy for a judge’s ideology, however, has been the party
of the official who appointed the judge.”); but see Fischman & Law, supra note 106, at
169–72 (noting potential limitations of using the political party of the appointing president
as a proxy for judicial ideology).
108. The 95% confidence interval = 46.7%–50.2%.
109. The 95% confidence interval = 50.3%–53.8%.
110. Here’s a fun aside: before presenting our initial research results at an academic
conference, we conducted two informal polls asking what characteristics folks thought
would reveal the biggest variance in stickiness. We posted one on Twitter the day before
our presentation and conducted the other by a show of hands at the beginning of our
presentation. One of the poll options was political affiliation of the appointing president.
Given the rhetoric around the supposedly different judging habits of Democratic-affiliated
and Republican-affiliated judges, we expected political affiliation to be a popular answer.
We were wrong. Quite wrong. Zero of the thirty Twitter users who responded selected this
answer. And zero of the thirty or so presentation attendees selected it either. Zero!
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Figure 15
Percentage of Sticky Citations from Briefs Used in Opinions by
Democratic-Affiliated Judges and Republican-Affiliated Judges
Democratic-Affiliated

Republican-Affiliated





Next, we drilled down to the actual appointing president,
whether Barack Obama (82), George W. Bush (73), Bill Clinton
(48), George H.W. Bush (37), Ronald Reagan (39), Jimmy
Carter (9), Gerald Ford (2), or Richard Nixon (1).
Figure 16
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions, by President Who Appointed Judge
Nixon (1)

Ford (2)

Carter (9)







Clinton (48)

G.W. Bush (73)

Obama (82)











We didn’t see an obvious pattern of citation stickiness that
matched political ideology, illustrated in Figure 16. The single
opinion authored by the judge appointed by President Nixon had
the highest stickiness percentage: 73%.111 And the two opinions

12/10/2019 14:38:26

111. The 95% confidence interval = 56.1%–85.4%.
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G.H.W. Bush (37)

Reagan (39)
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112. The 95% confidence interval = 26.2%–47.6%. A possibly interesting tidbit is that
despite the 37% difference in stickiness between the Nixon appointee’s opinion and the
Ford appointees’ opinions, the likelihood of a case cited in the briefs later being cited in the
opinion was nearly identical for these judges. Twenty-three percent of the cases cited by
the parties made it into the Ford appointees’ opinions and 24% made it into the Nixon
appointee’s opinion.
113. The 95% confidence interval = 34.9%–48.2%.
114. The 95% confidence interval = 48.3%–56.4%.
115. The 95% confidence interval = 53.3%–60.4%.
116. The 95% confidence interval = 46.0%–51.7%.
117. The Reagan-appointee opinions include four by Judge Posner, who cited a total of
thirteen cases.
118. The 95% confidence interval = 46.7%–51.6%.
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authored by judges appointed by President Ford had the lowest
stickiness percentage: 36%.112 The nine opinions authored by
judges appointed by President Carter were a bit higher at
41%.113 The number of cases cited in these three sets of opinions
also varied widely, with the Nixon appointee citing forty cases,
the Ford appointees citing an average of 42.5 cases, and the
Carter appointees citing an average of 24.7 cases. However, one,
two, and nine are pretty small as sample sizes go.
Looking at the next grouping of opinions, those authored
by judges appointed by Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush,
and Clinton, the stickiness percentages get a bit closer to the
49% overall average (and the average of 50% for opinions in the
judge-characteristic dataset). The citations in the thirty-nine
opinions authored by Reagan appointees were 52% sticky,114 the
citations in the thirty-seven opinions authored by George H.W.
Bush appointees were 57% sticky,115 and the citations in the
forty-eight opinions authored by Clinton appointees were 49%
sticky.116 The number of opinions cited in these three sets of
opinions varied, with the Reagan appointees citing an average of
15.8 cases per opinion,117 the George H.W. Bush appointees
citing an average of 21.5 cases per opinion, and the Clinton
appointees citing an average of 26.1 cases per opinion.
The last two groups of opinions were authored by the most
recently appointed judges, those appointed by Presidents George
W. Bush and Obama. There was no stickiness difference
between these two groups of opinions. The cases cited in the
seventy-three opinions authored by George W. Bush appointees
were 49% sticky,118 and the opinions cited an average of 22.3
cases. The cases cited in the eighty-two opinions authored by
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Obama appointees were 49% sticky,119 and the opinions cited an
average of 22.0 cases. The super-stickiness percentages were
also identical—21% for both George W. Bush and Obama
appointees. As was the likelihood of a case cited in a brief later
being cited in the opinion—15% for both.
2. Stickiness by Law School Attended
Next, we turned to the very serious question of whether the
law school attended by the authoring judge affected the
stickiness percentages in the opinions.120 We limited our
analysis to law schools that appeared at least ten times121 in our
judge-characteristic dataset. The eight law schools that met this
criterion—Boston University (10 opinions), Georgetown (13),
Harvard (43), Michigan (14), Texas (11), Tulane (10), Virginia
(16), and Yale (23)—are shown in Figure 17. The least sticky
law school was Georgetown, with alumni-authored opinions
yielding an average stickiness of 40%.122 The stickiest was
Boston University, with alumni-authored opinions yielding an
average stickiness of 61%.123 The schools with the most
opinions in our dataset, Harvard and Yale, were close to the
50% mean for the judge-characteristic dataset, with 51% and
49% stickiness, respectively. Opinions authored by Yale
graduates cited the most cases, an average of 30.2 per opinion,
nearly double the average of 16.8 cited in opinions by Virginia
graduates.
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 53 Side B
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119. The 95% confidence interval = 46.7%–51.3%.
120. Okay, maybe this one was not such a very serious question, but it is measurable
and folks seem interested in knowing the answer. Moreover, differences in the approaches
that various schools take to training their law students may affect how the schools’
graduates approach opinion-writing years later when they ascend to the federal bench.
121. This does not mean law schools attended by at least ten judges in our dataset. It
means that at least ten opinions were authored by judges who attended these law schools;
for example, the judge-characteristic dataset includes four opinions authored by Judge
Posner, which would count as four opinions for Harvard.
122. The 95% confidence interval = 34.0%–45.5%.
123. The 95% confidence interval = 53.9%–68.3%.
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Figure 17
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions,
by Authoring Judge’s Law School
Boston University (10)

Tulane (10)

University of Virginia (16)





Harvard (43)

Yale (23)



Michigan (14)







Texas (11)

Georgetown (16)





3. Stickiness by Whether Judge Sat by Designation
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 54 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

Of the 291 cases in our judge-characteristic dataset, twenty
were authored by judges sitting by designation. Of those
opinions, four were by appeals court judges and sixteen were
authored by district court judges. We had expected judges who
were sitting by designation to write opinions with notably
different stickiness percentages than opinions authored by
judges sitting with their home courts. However, it was less clear
to us which way the results would cut. A judge sitting away
from her home court is likely less familiar with the governing
law she is called upon to apply. That may drive her to rely more
heavily upon the briefs or to engage more heavily in
independent research. Either way, we figured it would have
some effect on citation stickiness.
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We were wrong. Judges sitting by designation wrote
opinions that were 49% sticky,124 and judges sitting with their
home courts wrote opinions that were 50% sticky,125 as
illustrated by Figure 18. The percentages were similarly close
for trial and appellate judges: district court judges wrote
opinions that were 51% sticky, and appellate judges wrote
opinions that were 50% sticky, as shown in Figure 19.
Figure 18
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions,
by Judges Sitting with Home Court or Sitting by Designation
Sitting with Home Court (271)



Sitting by Designation (20)



Figure 19
Percentage of Sticky Citations in Opinions,
by Designated District Judges and Designated Appellate Judges
Appellate Judges (275)



Judges sitting by designation did tend to cite six more cases
per opinion than did judges sitting with their home courts. The
difference between district and appellate judges in the group of
designated judges was smaller; they cited an average of 25.1 and
22.0 cases per opinion, respectively.126

12/10/2019 14:38:26

124. The 95% confidence interval = 44.5%–53.1%.
125. The 95% confidence interval = 48.9%–51.5%.
126. The four opinions authored by appellate judges sitting by designation contained a
much higher number of citations on average: 36.3.
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127. To calculate the number of years since birth, we subtracted the year of the judge’s
birth from the year 2017, the year from which we collected data. We did not use age
because the benefits seemed minimal compared to the cost of calculating each judge’s age
at the time the opinion was issued.
128. Many federal judges have prior judging experience on a state court, another federal
court, or both.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 55 Side A

Finally, we looked at various aspects of judicial experience:
years since primary law degree, years since current judicial
commission, years since birth,127 total number of judging
years,128 and senior or active status. We hypothesized that
judicial experience might correlate with increased or decreased
citation stickiness. Perhaps inexperienced judges would rely
more heavily on the authorities cited by the parties, or perhaps
their lack of experience would drive them to thoroughly research
the law in an effort to educate themselves. Perhaps more
experienced judges would give less weight to the parties’ briefs
and arguments and therefore be more likely to diverge from the
authorities cited by the parties. Or perhaps age and experience
would correlate with a sort of judicial lethargy in which the
judge becomes less likely to look beyond the parties’ briefs.
With the exception of the binary categories of senior and
active status, we calculated citation stickiness for all the
experience categories by dividing the data into decade-long
buckets: one to ten years, eleven to twenty years, and so on. We
expected judicial experience to affect stickiness, but overall we
didn’t observe any consistent pattern. The results are
summarized visually in Figures 20 through 25, but if you prefer
to read the results in text form, buckle up for the next five
paragraphs.
Let’s start with years since birth. The youngest judges in
our judge-characteristic dataset were, in 2017, between 41 and
50 years out from their births. As Figure 20 shows, the youngest
cohort authored seventeen opinions in our dataset and had the
second-lowest stickiness: 48%. This cohort also cited the fewest
cases in their opinions, an average of 18.9. The next four cohorts
(51 to 60, 61 to 70, 71 to 80, and 81 to 90) had stickiness
percentages hovering around the 49% mean, but gradually
increasing as their age increased (respectively, 49%, 49%, 49%,
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129. When we mention a judge’s years since commission, what we mean is the years
since the judge was commissioned on whatever court she was on when she authored the
opinion in our dataset. For judges not sitting by designation, that is the same court that
rendered the opinion. As an example, for a First Circuit opinion authored by a First Circuit
judge, the judge’s years since commission would be the number of years since her
commission on the First Circuit. Prior judging experience, including prior judging
experience as a federal district court judge, was not included. However, for a district court
judge sitting by designation, we measured the years since the judge was commissioned as a
district court judge.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 55 Side B

52%, and 52%). The oldest cohort of judges, who were between
91 and 100 years out from their births, authored three opinions.
These opinions had the lowest stickiness—45%. The five agerange cohorts cited a similar number of cases in their opinions
(respectively, 21.5, 23.4, 20.9, 24.2, and 22.0).
After being born, the next step to becoming a judge in our
dataset is attaining a law degree. Figure 21 shows that there
were four opinions in our dataset by judges who had attained
their law degrees between eleven and twenty years before 2017.
Those four opinions had the lowest stickiness percentage—43%.
The next five cohorts (21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, and
61 to 70) had similar stickiness percentages (respectively, 51%,
50%, 49%, 51%, and 55%). Those who had been law school
graduates the longest did cite notably more cases per opinion:
31.6 as compared to 22.8, 20.3, 22.2, 22.6, and 21.1.
At some point after attaining their law degrees, the judges
in our dataset were of course commissioned as federal appellate
judges.129 The most newly minted of them had received their
commissions between one and ten years before 2017. These
judges authored opinions that contained citations that were 49%
sticky. In fact, as you can see from Figure 22, years since
commission didn’t seem to move stickiness much one way or
the other. The next four cohorts (11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 years,
31 to 40 years, and 41 to 50 years) had similar stickiness
percentages (respectively, 48%, 55%, 49%, and 48%). The
greatest variation in cases cited was between the two longestcommissioned cohorts: opinions by judges who had been
commissioned for between 31 and 40 years cited an average of
17.5 cases, and opinions by judges who had been commissioned
for between 41 and 50 years cited an average of 41.7 cases.
However, there were only three opinions in the last group.
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Figure 20
Stickiness by Years Since Judge's Birth
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130. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1), (c); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 32 (1996) (explaining the criteria for senior status);
Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009:
The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their
Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11, 19–20 (2012) (same).
131. The 95% confidence interval = 49.5%–52.3%.
132. The 95% confidence interval = 45.3%–50.0%.
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Percentage of Sticky
Citations in Opinions

Our penultimate category was total judging experience,
which is reported in Figure 23. We added up each judge’s years
of judging—whether as a state judge or on any federal court.
The least-experienced cohort of judges had been judging for
between one and ten years. These judges authored forty-six of
the opinions in our judge-characteristic dataset, and these
opinions contained citations that were 48% sticky. The next four
cohorts (11 to 20 years, 21 to 30 years, 31 to 40 years, and 41 to
50 years) also had stickiness percentages around the mean
(respectively, 49%, 54%, 47%, and 49%). The most-experienced
cohort, judges who had been judging for between 51 and 60
years, authored opinions with the least sticky citations, having
an average of 44%. However, there were only two opinions in
that cohort. The number of cases cited per opinion didn’t vary
much across the cohorts: 20.7, 25.0, 21.8, 20.9, 20.4, and 26.0.
At last, we reach senior and active status. Federal judges
may take senior status based on their age and years of service;
thus, it is a proxy for experience.130 Within our judgecharacteristic dataset, 224 opinions were authored by activestatus judges and 67 opinions were authored by senior-status
judges. We didn’t see a great difference in stickiness: opinions
authored by senior judges contained citations that were 48%
sticky131 and opinions authored by active judges contained
citations that were 51% sticky.132 Active judges cited fewer
cases in their opinions, an average of 20.9 to senior judges’ 26.2.
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Percentage of Sticky
Citations in Opinions

Figure 21
Stickiness by Years Since Judge's Law Degree
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Figure 22
Stickiness by Years Since Judge's Commission
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Figure 23
Stickiness by Judge's Total Years of Service on All Courts
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Figure 24
Stickiness by Judge’s Active or Senior Status
Active Status (224)

Senior Status (67)





The text and figures in the section that you just read
describe an overview of our results. You can find a more
detailed presentation of the results in Appendices A, B, C, and
D.
IV. WHAT IT ALL MIGHT MEAN

12/10/2019 14:38:26

133. To be clear, we did not distinguish among which parts of the opinions (or briefs)
cited the cases. For example, it may well be that judges or courts have generic procedural
passages that they frequently cut and paste into opinions to recount well-worn standards of
review. Thus, the cases cited in the procedural passages may have stickiness rates below
49% and the cases cited in the “substantive” legal analysis may have stickiness rates above
49%. This is certainly an additional avenue for exploration, although the Marvell study
provides some relevant information here. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text. In
his study, Dr. Marvell found that only one-sixth of the cases cited in the parties’ briefs
were mentioned by the court. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 132. He surmised that this low
percentage may have been the product of the parties pressing arguments that the court did

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 57 Side A

So what do these results mean? Depending on what you
want to know, they mean either a great deal or not very much at
all.
If you want to know how often federal courts of appeals
cite to the same authorities as the parties, then our results will
tell you a lot. Forty-nine percent of the cases cited in published,
authored federal appellate opinions were previously cited in at
least one of the parties’ briefs. Fifty-one percent of the cases
cited were not mentioned in any of the briefs. To us, that 49%
figure is notable because it is lower than we expected it would
be.133
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But if you want to know why the stickiness is 49%, we
cannot tell you that. We can speculate though. Where do the
other 51% of cited cases come from? Intuition—and our own
clerkship experiences—point to independent research by the
courts. Either the judges or members of the judges’ staffs are
likely doing their own independent research and locating citeworthy cases that the parties never mentioned.134
In an ideal world, the parties would present the court with
the relevant cases and the court would discuss those same
relevant cases. Thus, the stickiness percentage of the cases cited
in the briefs would be at or near 100%. Courts would not need to
engage in independent legal research to locate relevant
authorities and there would be few or no endogenous case
citations in the opinions.135
That being said, a stickiness percentage of 100% would not
necessarily mean that the system was functioning well. A 100%

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 57 Side B
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not ultimately address. Indeed, he found that the court did not reach one quarter of the legal
arguments that the parties made in their briefs. Id. However, after omitting these undecided
legal arguments, Dr. Marvell still found that only one-fifth of the cases cited in the parties’
briefs were mentioned by the court. Id. Thus, looking only at the citations relating to the
substantive issues decided by the court still yielded a rather low percentage of citations
transmitted from the briefs to the opinion.
Additionally, our 49% stickiness figure does not account for depth of treatment. Our
study did not distinguish between cases that were cited only once in the parties’ briefs and
cases that were cited ten times. Presumably, the stickiness percentage is higher for cases
that garnered multiple citations in the parties’ briefs. This is another avenue for additional
research.
134. Perhaps some small percentage of cases cited in the opinions in our dataset were
mentioned by the parties somewhere other than the briefs—like at oral argument—and then
picked up by the court. We didn’t review the oral argument transcripts, so we can’t say for
sure, but our experience and Dr. Marvell’s previous research indicates that this is a rare
occurrence. See MARVELL, supra note 24, at 133 (finding that only 10% of the authorities
cited in the briefs were later mentioned at oral argument and only 1% of the total
authorities cited in the opinions were mentioned at oral argument but not mentioned in the
parties’ briefs). Indeed, one reason that we didn’t deem it necessary to review the oralargument transcripts is because it is so rare for a case to be mentioned for the first time at
oral argument.
Another possibility is that some percentage of the cases cited in the appellate
opinions in our dataset were cited in the underlying trial-level litigation—including the
district court’s opinion that was the focus of the appeal—yet were not mentioned in either
of the parties’ appellate briefs. Again, this seems likely to be rare.
135. Some endogenous case citations may be acceptable, however, because some legal
rules are identically repeated in numerous cases. Thus, for well-worn legal rules like
standards of review, it may matter little that the parties are citing one case and the court is
citing a different case as long as everyone is applying the identical rule.
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136. Or, at the very least, courts may be failing to explain why the cases and lines of
argument that they treat as irrelevant are in fact irrelevant.
137. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 74 (2008) (noting that certain
judges may be “more likely to focus on the ‘equities’ of the individual case—the aspects of
the case that tug at the heartstrings—and less on its precedential significance”). We would
think, however, that such judicial behavior—if in fact it occurs—would be more likely to
be relegated to unpublished opinions. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A
Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 223 (1999) (pointing out that “if, after hearing
argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also
believes that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result,
assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an
unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug”).
138. Excessive citation is a well-documented plague in legal writing. See, e.g., Alexa Z.
Chew, Stylish Legal Citation, 71 ARK. L. REV. 823, 854, 856–57 (2019) (describing

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A

stickiness average could be achieved if the parties cited a bunch
of irrelevant cases and the court was too idle to do any research
outside of the authorities cited in the briefs. On the other hand, a
stickiness percentage near zero would necessarily mean that the
system was working poorly. The parties and the court would
necessarily be talking past each other, either because the parties
were citing wholly irrelevant authorities or because the court
went rogue and decided the matter on some spontaneous ground
without the benefit of the parties’ input, or both.
So if we know that something approaching 100% stickiness
is our aspiration (although not in itself a sufficient indicator of a
properly functioning appellate process) and we know that
something approaching 0% stickiness is necessarily a sign of
major dysfunction in the system, what do we make of 49%? A
49% stickiness figure tells us that we don’t live in an ideal
world, but it doesn’t tell us precisely where the breakdowns are
occurring. Perhaps the critics are correct and either attorneys or
courts or both are producing less-than-stellar work product.
Perhaps attorneys’ briefs routinely feature numerous irrelevant
citations and not enough relevant ones. Maybe courts are
ignoring relevant cases and lines of argument that were raised by
the parties.136 It could be that courts are deciding cases based on
their own reasoning without the benefit of the parties’ input,
perhaps driven by the desire to rule in a particular party’s favor
regardless of whether that party has the better legal argument.137
Or it could be that judges—or their law clerks—strive to be
deliberately unsticky in an attempt to outdo the parties and
impress the world with garish displays of legal citation.138
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hypercitation as citing more authorities than are needed to support the proposition
asserted).
139. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
140. See Susan Nevelow Mart, Results May Vary: Which Database a Researcher Uses
Makes a Difference, 104 A.B.A. J. 48, 48–49 (Mar. 2018) (“In a comparison of six legal
databases—Casetext, Fastcase, Google Scholar, Lexis Advance, Ravel and Westlaw—
when researchers entered the identical search in the same jurisdictional database of
reported cases, there was hardly any overlap in the top 10 cases returned in the results.”);
Susan Nevelow Mart, The Relevance of Results Generated by Human Indexing and
Computer Algorithms: A Study of West’s Headnotes and Key Numbers and LexisNexis’s
Headnotes and Topics, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 221, 241, 240–44 (2010) (comparing the results
of using West and Lexis features for research and concluding that “each one will find some
relevant cases on your legal topic” but “it does not look like any one of them can be used to
find all relevant cases on your legal topic”).

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 58 Side B

Indeed, one trend that we observed was that the judicial
opinions that cited more cases tended to have lower citationstickiness percentages than opinions containing relatively fewer
case citations.139 Looking at number of cases cited, the top
quintile of opinions in our dataset cited an average of 47.5 cases.
The bottom quintile of opinions in our dataset cited an average
of 7.9 cases. The citation stickiness varied meaningfully
between these two groups of opinions: the top-quintile opinions
were 45% sticky, but the bottom-quintile opinions were 60%
sticky. Perhaps judges who do more independent research feel
compelled to show their work by citing more cases.
Another research-based factor driving down citation
stickiness may be the variety of research tools and methods.
Perhaps courts and attorneys use different research techniques or
platforms and are exposed to different spheres of research
results. If a court relies on Westlaw and the parties rely on
Lexis, similar searches could simply be returning different
results.140 Or even more innocuously, perhaps many cases are
simply interchangeable. If ten or twenty cases all state the same
proposition, then the parties and the court may cite to different
cases while discussing the same legal rules or lines of reasoning.
In that scenario, the court’s independent research turned up the
same legal principles as the parties’ research, which does not
suggest dysfunction.
Through comparison to Dr. Marvell’s study, one thing that
we do know is that stickiness percentages haven’t changed much
in recent decades. Our results are extremely similar to the results
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of that study from the 1970s.141 Dr. Marvell found that 48% of
the authorities cited in the opinions in his dataset had previously
been cited in the parties’ briefs.142 We found that 49% of the
cases cited in the opinions in our dataset had previously been
cited in the parties’ briefs.143 Dr. Marvell found that 17% of the
authorities cited in the parties’ briefs were later mentioned in the
opinions.144 We found that 16% of the cases cited in the parties’
briefs were later mentioned in the opinions.145
While Dr. Marvell studied a state supreme court in the
early 1970s,146 we studied the federal courts of appeals in
2017.147 Yet the similarity of our findings is notable, indicating
that the evolution of the research process from books to digital
databases148 has had little effect on citation stickiness. Given the
consistency between our findings and those of the Marvell
study, future researchers can use our findings—49% sticky
citations in opinions and 16% sticky citations in briefs—as
baselines to which to compare their results.149
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141. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
142. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 134.
143. See supra Part III.
144. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 134.
145. See supra Part III. Sixteen percent was a direct match with what another team of
researchers found when studying thirty First Circuit cases. See Oldfather, et al., supra note
48, at 1238.
146. MARVELL, supra note 24, at 6.
147. See supra Part II.
148. Over the past quarter century, legal research has shifted from a book-bound
endeavor to one that is often entirely digital. See, e.g., KENT C. OLSON, PRINCIPLES OF
LEGAL RESEARCH § 1.2, 5 (2009) (acknowledging that “[m]ost research these days is
conducted on the Internet”); see also Ellie Margolis & Kristen Murray, Using Information
Literacy to Prepare Practice-Ready Graduates, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (“Today’s
students do not remember a time when research could only be done in books, when the
only way to access cases was through a digest, when near-instantaneous access to
information did not exist.” (footnote omitted)); Ellie Margolis & Kristen E. Murray, Say
Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 117, 121–26 (2012) (describing the migration from print to digital
sources); John Palfrey, Cornerstones of Law Libraries for an Era of Digital-Plus, 102 L.
LIBR. J. 171, 172–77 (2010) (describing trends in legal information use).
149. For example, future research could uncover whether citations in amicus briefs are
similarly sticky. That would shed light on whether amicus briefs are worthwhile. Likewise,
future research could uncover whether particular types of cases—such as nonbinding cases
in general or unpublished cases in particular—include citations that are similarly sticky.
Again, this could inform briefwriting decisions.
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Our results also demonstrate that judicial characteristics
play little role in citation stickiness. The stickiness percentage
was similar for judges appointed by Democratic (48%) and
Republican (52%) presidents.150 Whether the authoring judge
was a district court judge (51%) or an appellate judge (50%)
also mattered little, as did whether the authoring judge was
sitting by designation (49%) or sitting with her home court
(50%).
None of our metrics of judicial experience yielded
significantly different stickiness rates. Active-status judges
(51%) were similarly sticky to senior-status judges (48%).
While there were some isolated differences in stickiness when it
came to age and judging experience, there were almost no
observable trends. For example, the oldest judges were the least
sticky (45%), but judges in the two next oldest age brackets
were the most sticky (52%).151 Setting aside two very small
sample sizes, there was almost no variation in stickiness based
on how long it had been since the authoring judge graduated
from law school.152 Mild variations were exhibited based on the
number of years since the authoring judge had been
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150. While there wasn’t a meaningful difference between the stickiness percentages of
opinions authored by appointees of Democratic and Republican presidents, there was some
variation among judges appointed by individual presidents. The most noteworthy variation
was the 57% stickiness of opinions authored by judges appointed by President George
H.W. Bush. This stickiness percentage was notable because it was the product of a notinsignificant sample size (thirty-seven opinions) and was noticeably higher than other
recent presidents with not-insignificant sample sizes (all of whom clustered around
stickiness rates between 49 and 52%). Perhaps judges appointed by President George H.W.
Bush possess an approach to decisionmaking that is uniform to a unique extent. Another
researcher has found that judges appointed by President George H.W. Bush are more
partisan than judges appointed by any other President from Carter to George W. Bush. See
Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and
Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 539 (2012). Perhaps
some relationship exists between partisanship and citation stickiness.
151. See Figure 20, supra page 103. Setting aside judges older than ninety because
there were only three results in that category, the other five decades showed almost no
differences in stickiness. In ascending order, the stickiness rates by decade were 48%, 49%,
49%, 52%, and 52%.
152. See Figure 21, supra page 104. In ascending order, the stickiness rates by decade
for the other four brackets were 51%, 50%, 49%, and 51%.
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153. See Figure 22, supra page 104. For the four brackets with more than ten results,
the stickiness rates based on years since commission were—in ascending order—49%,
48%, 55%, and 49%.
154. See Figure 23, supra page 104. For the five brackets with more than ten results, the
stickiness rates based on total judging years were—in ascending order—48%, 49%, 54%,
47%, and 49%.
155. When sorted by Westlaw topic, the stickiest topics were Government (53%), Labor
and Employment (52%), and Sentencing (52%), and the least sticky were Bankruptcy
(41%) and Patents (42%). But none of those topics had more than twenty cases in our
dataset.
156. Indeed, too many string citations could prevent a court from adequately engaging
with the cited authorities. See Chew, supra note 138, at 854 (explaining that excessive

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 60 Side A

commissioned a federal judge153 or had started judging,154 but
again without any consistent trend.
Likewise, the type of case, broadly speaking, had little
effect on stickiness. Civil cases (48%) and criminal cases (51%)
were similarly sticky. And, although there were some
differences in stickiness rates when the cases were sorted by
Westlaw topic, we simply don’t have a big enough dataset to
determine whether those differences are meaningful.155
If judge and case characteristics don’t matter much,
potential avenues for further research could involve isolating
characteristics of attorneys or their briefs. We observed that only
16% of the cases cited in the parties’ briefs later appear in the
resulting opinions. But we wouldn’t expect this number to
approach 100%, even in an ideal adversarial system. Parties
sensibly make alternative arguments in their briefs. Appellate
courts, being economical, decide appeals on as few grounds as
possible. Thus, an appellant may urge reversal based on three
alleged errors. But if the appellate court finds one of the errors
reversible it may not analyze the other two. With this in mind,
the parties understandably cite more authorities than the courts.
Yet, 16% struck us as an unexpectedly low stickiness rate for
cases cited in the parties’ briefs, and the 38% stickiness rate for
cases that had been cited in both parties’ briefs struck us as
especially surprising. A case that both parties deemed relevant to
discuss still had a 62% likelihood of not being mentioned by the
court. Maybe this is the product of too many string citations in
the briefs or too many alternative arguments, but maybe it is also
the product of courts failing to adequately engage with the
authorities cited by the parties.156
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We observed that courts tended to borrow citations more
heavily from winning parties’ briefs than from losing parties’
briefs.157 Thus, the key to getting the court to borrow more of a
party’s citations may simply be for the party to win the case. Or,
perhaps, the way for a party to win a case is to have the court
adopt many of its case citations. Apart from winning and losing,
some pre-decisional attribute or set of attributes may tend to
make some attorneys’ briefs stickier than others. Stay tuned for
further research.
V. CONCLUSION

12/10/2019 14:38:26

citations “drain[] reader energy” and summarizing various legal writing experts’ distaste
for string citations).
157. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Section I.A.
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The big takeaway from this empirical study is that courts—
not parties—accounted for more than half of the 7552 cases
cited in the 325 judicial opinions we looked at. This result
surprised us, as it surprised the small Twitter and conference
audiences that we polled. Based only on this study, we don’t
know why so many cases cited in opinions were endogenous.
But our discovery that more than 50% of the cases cited in
judicial opinions are endogenous is a novel finding.
Earlier studies that looked at stickiness used much smaller
samples of cases decided in only a few courts; our study
provides results based on a much more robust dataset.158 But
beyond just filling a gap in the data, we hope that our study of
citation stickiness provides an empirical foundation for future
discussions on legal persuasion. In theory, the parties’ research
should have a great deal of influence on judicial decisions. Yet
in practice, citation stickiness is both variable and, on average,
lower than that theory predicts.
Our study suggests that scholars of legal persuasion and
judicial decisionmaking should consider citation stickiness
because it’s an easy-to-calculate proxy for the influence that
parties’ research has on judicial decisions: divide the total
number of cases cited in both an opinion and the briefs by the
number of cases cited in the opinion. This quick calculation
reveals to what degree the parties’ research “stuck” to the
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judicial decision, which in turn can inform any decision about
whether additional, more labor-intensive study into the whys
and hows is warranted.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 61 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 61 Side B

12/10/2019 14:38:26

%(11$5'2&+(:5(6(1' '2127'(/(7( 

114



30

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

APPENDIX A
APPEAL CHARACTERISTICS
Cases
Cited in
Opinions

Average
Cases Cited
per Opinion

Sticky
Cites in
Opinions

SuperSticky
Cites in
Opinions

Overall
All Appeals

325

23479

7552

23.2

3699

1613

Circuit
1st Circuit

25

1770

626

25.0

354

152

2d Circuit
3d Circuit

25
25

2312
1867

663
796

26.5
31.8

299
333

137
128

4th Circuit
5th Circuit

25
25

2002
1587

436
574

17.4
23.0

240
277

121
109

6th Circuit
7th Circuit

25
25

1571
1762

617
397

24.7
15.9

301
196

110
83

8th Circuit
9th Circuit

25
25

1613
2110

439
552

17.6
22.1

249
283

110
136

10th Circuit
11th Circuit

25
25

1947
2054

777
667

31.1
26.7

352
324

141
129

D.C. Circuit
Fed. Circuit

25
25

1455
1429

520
488

20.8
19.5

265
226

159
98

Civil or Criminal
Civil

213

15962

4772

22.4

2280

1019

Criminal

112

7385

2780

24.8

1419

594

Westlaw Topic
Bankruptcy
Civil Rights

14
27

1099
2003

364
856

26.0
31.7

150
377

57
150

Commercial
Government

14
20

1077
1359

367
316

26.2
15.8

167
168

83
90

Labor/Employment
Litigation

32
19

2281
1591

699
421

21.8
22.2

360
199

167
97

Patents
Sentencing

15
33

830
1740

247
699

16.5
21.2

103
364

41
142
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Opinions

Briefs

Percent
Sticky

Percent
Endogenous

Percent
Super-Sticky

Percent
Sticky

49%

51%

21%

16%

1st Circuit

57%

43%

24%

20%

2d Circuit
3d Circuit

45%
42%

55%
58%

21%
16%

13%
18%

4th Circuit
5th Circuit

55%
48%

45%
52%

28%
19%

12%
17%

6th Circuit
7th Circuit

49%
49%

51%
51%

18%
21%

19%
11%

8th Circuit
9th Circuit

57%
51%

43%
49%

25%
25%

15%
13%

10th Circuit
11th Circuit

45%
49%

55%
51%

18%
19%

18%
16%

D.C. Circuit
Fed. Circuit

51%
46%

49%
54%

31%
20%

18%
16%

Civil or Criminal
Civil

48%

52%

21%

14%

Criminal

51%

49%

21%

19%

Westlaw Topic
Bankruptcy
Civil Rights

41%
44%

59%
56%

16%
18%

14%
19%

Commercial Law
Government

46%
53%

54%
47%

23%
28%

16%
12%

Labor/Employment
Litigation

52%
47%

48%
53%

24%
23%

16%
13%

Patents
Sentencing

42%
52%

58%
48%

17%
20%

12%
21%

Overall
All Appeals
Circuit*
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*The 95% confidence intervals for each circuit: First Circuit = 52.6%–60.5%; Second Circuit =
41.3%–49.0%; Third Circuit = 38.4%–45.3%; Fourth Circuit = 50.2%–59.8%; Fifth Circuit =
44.1%–52.4%; Sixth Circuit = 44.8%–52.8%; Seventh Circuit = 44.3%–54.4%; Eighth Circuit =
51.9%–61.4%; Ninth Circuit = 47.0%–55.5%; Tenth Circuit = 41.8%–48.9%; Eleventh Circuit =
44.7%–52.4%; D.C. Circuit = 46.6%–55.3%; Federal Circuit = 41.8%–50.8%.
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APPENDIX B
JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS
Sticky
Cites

SuperSticky
Cites

Affiliation of Appointing President
Democratic
139
10113
Republican
152
10794

3279
3161

23.6
20.8

1588
1633

658
720

Excluded

2440

1112

32.7

478

235

Appointing President
Obama
82
GW Bush
73

5893
5186

1804
1625

22.0
22.3

884
798

387
339

Clinton
GHW Bush

48
37

3404
2728

1253
796

26.1
21.5

612
453

239
220

Reagan
Carter

39
9

2625
816

615
222

15.8
24.7

322
92

142
32

Ford
Nixon

2
1

133
122

85
40

42.5
40.0

31
29

7
12

Excluded

34

Law School
BU
Georgetown

10
13

623
794

186
290

18.6
22.3

114
115

48
42

Harvard
Michigan

43
14

2739
1155

925
260

21.5
18.6

474
126

220
59

Texas
Tulane

11
10

659
747

209
272

19.0
27.2

100
149

47
61

UVA
Yale

16
23

1302
1856

268
694

16.8
30.2

148
341

61
121

Sitting by Designation—All
Designated
20
1663

547

267

98

Home

5893

27.4
21.7

2954

1280

25.1
22.0

206
3015

80
1298

271

19244

Sitting by Designation—District or Appellate
District
16
1276
402
Appellate
275
19631
6038
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Average
Cases Cited
per Opinion

34

Cases
Cited in
Briefs
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Opinions

Percent
Sticky

Briefs
Percent
Super-Sticky

Percent Sticky

Affiliation of Appointing President
Democratic
48%

52%

20%

16%

Republican

52%

48%

23%

15%

Appointing President
Obama
GW Bush

49%
49%

51%
51%

21%
21%

15%
15%

Clinton
GHW Bush

49%
57%

51%
43%

19%
28%

18%
17%

Reagan
Carter

52%
41%

48%
59%

23%
14%

12%
11%

Ford
Nixon

36%
73%

64%
28%

8%
30%

23%
24%

Law School
BU

61%

39%

26%

18%

Georgetown
Harvard

40%
51%

60%
49%

14%
24%

14%
17%

Michigan
Texas

48%
48%

52%
52%

23%
22%

11%
15%

Tulane
UVA

55%
55%

45%
45%

22%
23%

20%
11%

Yale

49%

51%

17%

18%

Sitting by Designation—All
By Designation
49%
Home
50%

51%
50%

18%
22%

16%
15%

Sitting by Designation—District or Appellate
District
51%
49%

20%

16%

Appellate

21%

15%

50%

50%
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Cases
Cited in
Briefs

Cases
Cited in
Opinions

Sticky Cites

Super-Sticky
Cites

Average
Cases
Cited per
Opinion

Years from Birth
41 to 50
17
51 to 60
63

1222
4756

322
1352

155
660

60
278

18.9
21.5

61 to 70
71 to 80

97
78

6475
5812

2269
1634

1111
852

474
437

23.4
20.9

81 to 90
91 to 100

33
3

2394
248

797
66

413
30

177
11

24.2
22.0

Opinions

Years since Law Degree
11 to 20
4
384

39

20

22.8

55
60

3819
4392

1116
1334

564
668

238
312

20.3
22.2

41 to 50
51 to 60

109
54

7417
4015

2464
1140

1217
578

475
264

22.6
21.1

61 to 70

9

783

284

157

71

31.6

Years from Commission
1 to 10
91
6706
11 to 20
83
5863

2035
2050

1003
976

440
395

22.4
24.7

21 to 30
31 to 40

71
43

5080
3003

1476
754

815
367

367
157

20.8
17.5

41 to 50

3

255

125

60

19

41.7

Total Judging Years
1 to 10
46
11 to 20
71

3245
5728

953
1773

457
863

204
354

20.7
25.0

21 to 30
31 to 40

91
58

6147
4002

1980
1212

1077
571

490
219

21.8
20.9

41 to 50
51 to 60

23
2

1608
177

470
52

230
23

104
7

20.4
26.0

Active or Senior
Active
224

16111

4684

2384

1040

20.9

Senior

4796

1756

837

338

26.2

67
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Opinions

Briefs

Percent
Endogenous

Percent
Super-Sticky

Percent
Sticky

Years from Birth
41 to 50

48%

52%

19%

13%

51 to 60
61 to 70

49%
49%

51%
51%

21%
21%

14%
17%

71 to 80
81 to 90

52%
52%

48%
48%

27%
22%

15%
17%

91 to 100

45%

55%

17%

12%

Years since Law Degree
11 to 20
43%
21 to 30
51%

57%
49%

22%
21%

10%
15%

31 to 40
41 to 50

50%
49%

50%
51%

23%
19%

15%
16%

51 to 60
61 to 70

51%
55%

49%
45%

23%
25%

14%
20%

Years from Commission
1 to 10
49%

51%

22%

15%

11 to 20
21 to 30

48%
55%

52%
45%

19%
25%

17%
16%

31 to 40
41 to 50

49%
48%

51%
52%

21%
15%

12%
24%

Total Judging Years
1 to 10

48%

52%

21%

14%

11 to 20
21 to 30

49%
54%

51%
46%

20%
25%

15%
18%

31 to 40
41 to 50

47%
49%

53%
51%

18%
22%

14%
14%

51 to 60

44%

56%

13%

13%

Active or Senior
Active
Senior

51%
48%

49%
52%

22%
19%

15%
17%

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 64 Side A

Percent
Sticky

12/10/2019 14:38:26

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 64 Side B

12/10/2019 14:38:26

%(11$5'2&+(:5(6(1' '2127'(/(7( 

120



30

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

APPENDIX C
BRIEF CHARACTERISTICS
Cases Cited
in Briefs

Sticky Cites
per Brief

Percent
Sticky

Average Cases
Cited per Brief

Opening Briefs (325)

11168

2156

19%

34.4

Response Briefs (325)

13166

2759

21%

40.5

Reply Briefs (295)

5827

1245

21%

19.8

Opening and Reply Briefs

14659

2563

17%

_____

Cited in Both Parties’ Briefs

4276

1613

38%

_____

From Response Brief to Reply Brief

1105

283

26%

___

From One Party’s Brief to Opinion

23536

3699

16%

_____

From Both Parties’ Briefs to Opinion

23536

1613

7%

_____
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APPENDIX D
WINNINGNESS
Cases Cited
in Briefs

Cases Cited
in Opinions

Sticky
Cites

SuperSticky Cites

Average Cites
per Opinion

Appellant Won (86)

5807

1805

861

421

21.0

Appellee Won (201)

14021

4431

2287

977

22.0

Citations in Opinions

Citations in Briefs

Percent Sticky

Percent Super Sticky

Percent Sticky

Appellant Won

48%

23%

15%

Appellee Won

52%

22%

16%

Sticky Cites
(Out of 6236 Cases
Cited in All Opinions)

Percent Sticky
Cites in Opinions

Percent Sticky
Cites in Briefs

Winning Party (297)

11937

2530

41%

21%

Losing Party (297)

11786

2026

32%

17%

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 65 Side A

Cases Cited
in Briefs

12/10/2019 14:38:26

